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The Role of Arms Control in the Middle East

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The Role of Arms Control in the Middle East

INTRODUCTION

This study deals with past experience, present issues and the future of arms control in the Arab–Israeli region of the Middle East.

Since the early 1950s, large areas of the Middle East have been characterized by the build-up of a high level of arms and armed forces. This process has become one of the principal features of international politics in the Middle East, associated with the several levels of conflict in the 'heart' of the Middle East, namely, the Arab–Israeli conflict, the competition among the Arab states for positions of power, and the competition between the super-powers.[1]

For the purposes of the study of arms races and arms control,[2] the eastern Middle East (as distinct from the Maghreb) may be divided roughly into two areas. The first, the Arab–Israeli region, comprises Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan and, to some extent, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. These are the states most involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict (Egypt, Syria and Jordan have also, for the last few years, been referred to as the 'confrontation' countries). The second, the Persian Gulf region, consists of Iran, Kuwait and, again, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. For political reasons Saudi Arabia and Iraq are involved in both regions.

The analytical division of the Middle East into two sub-regions is corroborated by the existence of two arms races. The allocation of resources for defence purposes in the Arab–Israeli region resulted primarily from the dynamics of the conflict there and, secondly, from political competition among the Arab countries.[3] The Persian Gulf states, primarily Saudi Arabia and Iran,[4] were not involved in a significant arms build-up until the late 1960s, and 1973 arms acquisition increased considerably after the tremendous rise in their oil revenues. Although there are some elements of the 'action-reaction' process in the acquisition of arms by Iran and Saudi Arabia, and hence of an arms race, there are other motivations for their arms build-up. Iran, in particular, has a range of security interests which extends far beyond her relationship with Saudi Arabia.

The arms build-up in Iran[5] and Saudi Arabia (and Kuwait, although the size there is rather limited) may have serious repercussions on the security concerns of Israel and the Arab confrontation states. This is primarily because Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are purchasing weapons systems which they intend quite openly to transfer to the confrontation countries, and they may send troops to the front in the event of another war with Israel.[6] Iraq was involved in acquiring arms earlier than these states because of her participation in the Arab–Israeli conflict and in the intra-Arab competition.

This does not mean that arms-control arrangements in connection with Israel and the Arab confrontation states are not possible unless related measures were taken throughout the Persian Gulf region.[7] It does mean, however, that the arms build-up in the Persian Gulf area, and especially in Saudi Arabia, affects decisions on arms control in the Arab–Israeli region.

What is Meant by Arms Control?

Arms control is defined here in a conservative–traditional way: that is, as any measure taken in the military security field which increases strategic stability in the relations of states involved in a conflict. Strategic stability is the diminution in the frequency of wars and, once they occur, their limitation. A related objective of arms control is the limitation and reduction of defence expenditure, provided strategic stability is not harmed.[8] Hence arms control is a broader concept than mere limitations to the acquisition of arms.

So much has been written on arms control that to rehearse the basic assumptions would seem superfluous.[9] Yet precisely because the debate is so extensive, and also because discussion about arms-control agreements reached over the last few years has questioned some of the more traditional notions, it is perhaps worthwhile to refer briefly to the underlying notions and ideas of my more conservative approach.

To begin with, the structure of the international system, which is composed of nation states at times in conflict, is taken for granted. International crises, violence and war are accepted as part of the international scene. Arms control is not expected to bring about a fundamental change in this sad state of affairs but is intended only to increase relative stability within this framework. Arms control operates only in the military security areas; its impact on political developments, although sometimes considerable, is indirect. Arms control is achieved only when the contracting partners' defence establishments recognize that arms-control agreements improve their respective countries' security, or at least do not hamper it. Finally, there is recognition that in every international dispute, or certainly in the great majority of them, common and conflicting interests co-exist. All these points are applicable to the current Middle East situation, and will continue to apply even if a political settlement is reached.

The theory of arms control has developed within the framework of the super-powers' relations. It is part of the 'strategic paradigm', which has focused primarily on the bipolar nuclear relationship. There are, of course, important structural differences between the super-power relationship and the one existing in the Arab–Israeli complex, so that we cannot replicate the same model of relations for the Middle East. My contention, however, is that theories of strategy and of arms control, as developed by the modern strategists, transcend that model and are applicable to non-nuclear, non-bipolar strategic relations such as those in the Middle East.

This study combines an analysis of what has happened with ideas about and proposals for future arms-control measures. Chapter I focuses on past attempts at arms control and demonstrates that there are important precedents for explicit and, even more, for tacit arms-control agreements in the Middle East. In Chapter II the various stages of the arms race are discussed, and the relationship between them and war is analysed. An account follows of the arms build-up since 1973 in conjunction with developments in the strategic doctrines of Egypt, Israel and Syria. Chapter III offers ideas for future arms-control measures, delineating five main areas of arms control. Chapter IV discusses the possible contribution of the super-powers to arms control in the Middle East. A concluding chapter looks at the relationship between arms control and political negotiations for a settlement and finally discusses priorities among the measures proposed and the possible stages by which they could be implemented.

I. PAST ATTEMPTS AT ARMS-CONTROL MEASURES IN THE ARAB–ISRAELI REGION

United Nations Control of Arms Transfers

It was at an early stage in the Arab–Israeli conflict that certain external powers and the United Nations (UN) first intervened to impose limitations on arms supplies to the combatants. The first such step – taken during the 1948 war – was a UN embargo. This was part of the Security Council cease-fire resolution of 29 May 1948, which stipulated that no 'war material' should be exported to the warring sides.[10] The embargo's objective was to prevent either side from using the cease-fire period to change the balance of power in its favour. The cease-fire resolution was extended on 15 July (after ten days of hostilities), and the embargo remained in effect even after the adoption of a Security Council resolution calling for a truce in November 1948. The embargo was largely ineffective,[11] as was a General Assembly resolution including an arms embargo, adopted on 2 November 1956.

The Tripartite Declaration

On 4 August 1949 the United States, Britain and France declared that they were opposed to the development of an arms race in the Palestine area. When Israeli and Egyptian requests for arms multiplied in 1949–50, the United States initiated the convening of a meeting with Britain and France which ended with the Tripartite Declaration, signed by the three powers on 25 May 1950.[12] It included the signatories' guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Middle Eastern countries. This was an attempt to stabilize the area following the tribulations of the Arab–Israeli war of 1948–9. Second, the signatories undertook to regulate the flow of arms to the Middle East which, at the time, they monopolized.

Historically, this became the most important formal agreement among external powers governing the transfer of arms to the Middle East. It was, indeed, a major 'arms-control' agreement, and it established a regulatory mechanism, the Near East Arms Co-ordinating Committee. The Committee was quite effective, and, although both Israel and the Arab countries criticized the Declaration and tried at various junctures to circumvent the Committee's control, they did not consider the Declaration a major irritant, and certainly not something which endangered their security.

The Declaration enabled the United States to continue with her own embargo, which had been imposed in 1948. This was in fact directed primarily against Israel and Egypt,[13] and although only partial and selective, it was quite effective in inhibiting American transfers of arms. It did not, however, suppress the transfer of arms when the arms race escalated in the mid-1950s. (In fact, as will be shown below, embargoes imposed by one supplier alone do not, as a rule, halt an arms race; indeed, on occasions they accelerate it.) American concern to keep a certain military balance between Israel and her Arab neighbours was de-emphasized during her efforts in 1953–4 to establish a pro-Western defence organization in the Middle East. The plan was to centre this organization on Egypt or, alternatively, to concentrate on the 'northern tier' countries, namely, Turkey, Iraq and Iran.

Britain, both independently and in concert with the United States, had taken steps from 1951 onwards which led eventually to the creation of the Baghdad Pact in February 1955. Thus two of the signatories to the Declaration had already begun to undermine it, and the suspicions thereby generated were among the causes of the next round of the arms race in the Middle East. The tension along the Arab–Israeli borders and the eventual Egyptian–Soviet arms deal of 1955 (which came to be known as the Egyptian–Czechoslovak arms deal) led to a major quantitative and qualitative escalation in the arms race; for all practical purposes the Declaration died with the Egyptian deal.

Yet time and again the United States refused large-scale supplies of arms to Egypt. This stance dates back to the late 1940s and has, with some exceptions, continued since then. (One outstanding exception was the supply, during the 1950s, of 150 M-4 *Sherman* tanks.)[14] There have been several occasions when the United States has considered arms deals with Egypt, especially during the first half of the 1950s, but in each case the United States has attached certain political conditions, all of which have been rejected by Egypt.[15] Later, once Egypt had become dependent on Soviet arms, the whole question of American arms supplies became irrelevant. Britain, for her part, had traditionally served as the main supplier of arms to Egypt, but when negotiations on the future of the British military base in Egypt began in earnest in 1953, Britain became reluctant to supply her with large quantities of arms, hoping that this would serve as a bargaining chip. This attitude changed only after the signing in October 1954 of the British–Egyptian Agreement stipulating British withdrawal from the Suez Canal base.

After the 1955 Soviet–Egyptian arms deal, the United States realized that the military balance between Israel and Egypt had tipped in favour of the latter, and, rather than supplying Israel with the necessary arms, she preferred that another arms-producing country should do so. This decision stemmed from American concern about possible adverse Arab reactions. It was with American encouragement, therefore, that France acted as a major supplier of arms to Israel until 1967 – though in 1963 the United States did supply Israel with 288 *HAWK* surface-to-air missiles, and in 1966 an order was confirmed for the supply of 48 A-4H *Skyhawk* fighter-bombers.

In contrast to her reluctance to supply arms to Israel – over a long period of time – and to

Egypt, however, the United States was prepared to transfer arms to other countries in the Middle East and supplied Iraq (in the 1950s), Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon with many of their arms. The deals were accompanied by publicly voiced concern about an arms race in the Middle East and the need to curb it. In his speech on 7 August 1958 before the UN General Assembly Emergency Session, for example, President Eisenhower called for steps to pre-empt a new round of the arms race in the Middle East. President Kennedy pointed out on 8 May 1963 that the United States was searching for ways to 'limit the arms race in the Middle East'.[16] Apart from the *de facto* embargo on supplies of American arms to Israel and Egypt referred to above, however, no other arms-control measures were applied.

The French Embargo

France imposed a partial embargo during the 1967 war, directed at all the Middle Eastern countries involved in the conflict. Since Israel was the main recipient of French arms in the Middle East, she was most affected by the embargo but, although total at its inception, it very quickly became a very partial embargo, relating only to 50 *Mirage V* fighter-bombers ordered by Israel in 1965, delivery of which was expected by late 1967. Ironically, the volume of French arms transferred to Israel *increased* after the imposition of the partial embargo.[17] In a frantic effort Israel bought as much as she could from France to escape the effects of a possible reimposition of a total embargo. Such an embargo was imposed in January 1969, after the Israeli raid on Beirut. It was again replaced by a 'selective' embargo in July 1969 but, following the smuggling out from Cherbourg of missile boats ordered by Israel and built in France, the French reimposed a total embargo, which, in turn, gradually became partial. By then, however, Israel had come to prefer American arms.

The French embargo was intended to apply pressure on Israel to comply with French political demands, but it also served as a symbolic gesture towards the Arab world, which the French government was trying to woo. As far as arms control was concerned, though, the embargo was counter-productive. It heightened Israel's anxieties and forced her to increase, rather than decrease, purchases of arms from every possible quarter. It also contributed to the Israeli decision to rely much more on indigenous production of arms and ammunition: the decision to launch the enterprises of an Israeli tank[18] and an Israeli fighter-bomber/interceptor was to a large degree prompted by the lessons Israel had learnt.

The Soviet Position

Soviet Arms-control Initiatives

The Soviet position on arms control in the Middle East has in most cases had a negative effect. The Soviet Union succeeded in penetrating the Middle East primarily by means of arms aid and trade, which remains of major importance in her calculations. At the same time, the Soviet Union has shown some interest in arms-control measures when this has served her interests. During the second half of the 1950s, for example, the Soviet Union at least *appeared* to be interested in curtailing arms transfers to Middle Eastern countries and in other arms-control measures. At a meeting in London in spring 1956 the British delegation suggested limitations on deliveries of arms to the Middle East,[19] and on 27 April Mr Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, responded by suggesting an embargo on the flow of arms into the same region.[20] In a 1957 memorandum, the Soviet Union again urged an agreement between East and West on halting deliveries of arms to the Middle East,[21] insisting that such an agreement should include, among other things, the renunciation of attempts to involve Middle Eastern countries in military blocs, the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops. One of the consequences of such an agreement would have been the dissolution of the Baghdad Pact – later replaced by the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) – another would have been withdrawal of American military units from Turkey and Iran. The United States State Department, of course, rejected both the 1956 and the 1957 proposals.[22] Two more Soviet initiatives for the control of conventional arms transfers to the Middle East were made in 1958. On 31 January 1958, in an interview with *The Times*, Mr Khrushchev emphasized the need for a moratorium on arms shipments to the area. The second initiative was included in a memorandum to the United States government on 5 May 1958 calling for an agreement to limit the supply of arms to the Middle Eastern countries.

At the time the Soviet position in the Middle East was still very insecure. Against that background the Soviet demands appeared to the West extreme, an attempt to secure for the Soviet Union advantages far beyond what she could gain through continued 'free' competition with the West. The more the Soviet Union's influence increased in the Middle East, the less eager she became to conclude such agreements. She assumed, instead, that massive backing of the 'radical' Arab states – chiefly demonstrated by the transfer of arms, partly as gifts and partly under very generous credit arrangements – would give her the same political and strategic profits she hoped to gain by reaching an arrangement with the United States.

The first Soviet proposals pertained to the whole of the Middle East (and not just the Arab–Israeli area), but other Soviet proposals of the time extended the area under discussion to the whole of the Mediterranean. Moreover, the emphasis had shifted to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and several Soviet statements and initiatives referred to this: a statement in Tass on 21 January 1958;[23] the aforementioned memorandum of 5 May 1959 (although in that only the Middle East was mentioned), and a note to the United States government of 20 May 1963 about denuclearization of the Mediterranean.[24] Whereas the United States was seeking to bring about a stable military balance in the Arab–Israeli region, the Soviet Union was trying to extend the area to which arms-control agreements might apply to the whole of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. *Regional* military balances were, at the time, of less concern to the Soviet Union.

A Conflict of Aims in Soviet Policy

A shift in this attitude came about only after the 1967 war, when it became clear to the Soviet Union that changes in the Arab–Isreali regional balance were of the utmost importance to Soviet interests.

The Soviet Union had three additional reasons for supplying her Arab clients with arms and, indeed, for increasing the quantity. In the first place, as the patron and informal guarantor of Egypt and Syria she had to prove to these countries (and to other clients and allies) her credibility as a super-power ally. Second, if another outbreak of hostilities occurred between Israel and Egypt and Syria, the extreme weakness of the Arab armies might lead to their immediate collapse.[25] The Soviet Union would then have to face a tortuous dilemma: to honour her informal commitment to come to the aid of these countries, thereby increasing the danger of a direct confrontation with the United States, or to stand aside and thus lose further credibility and substantial tangible stakes. Third, the Soviet Union realized – as did her Arab partners – that in order to secure the return of the territories conquered by Israel in 1967 diplomatic activity had to be combined with the creation of an option for some military action against Israel. Only if this option existed – an option the exercise of which was not necessarily in the Soviet Union's interest – could the Arab countries establish a strong position in any future diplomatic negotiations; but such an option necessitated the rebuilding of the Arab armies and the narrowing of the military gap between Israel and the Arab states.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union probably realized that unlimited and uncontrolled arms transfers to the Arabs might lead the Arab governments to the conclusion that they were capable of launching an offensive against Israel, even if that offensive was not politically convenient for the Soviet Union. Soviet opposition to such a military operation was prompted by two considerations: first, it might end with a major Arab defeat, thus forcing upon the Soviet Union precisely the dilemma she wanted to avoid, and second, but less significant in her calculations, even if she were able to avoid such direct confrontation with the United States, a war might nevertheless endanger the process of detente. This latter consideration was a complex one, since the Soviet Union must have been aware that her ability to control the Arab countries was in any case restricted, and that a limited Arab gain, achieved by a swift military operation, would, in certain circumstances, do only small damage to the process of detente. Indeed, to an extent, the very process of detente was possible only because areas of high tension such as the Middle East were dissociated from the three major issues confronting the super-powers which served as the focus of detente: limitations on

strategic arms, the *status quo* in Europe and economic and technological relations. This was not the American concept of detente, but even Washington eventually partly abandoned her insistence on 'coupling' as a main feature of detente.

The Soviet Union did use her power to withhold arms, probably in order to discourage Egypt from pursuing military initiatives. In October 1971 an agreement on arms deliveries to Egypt was concluded, but the Soviet Union did not act on it fully.[26] This Soviet reluctance was motivated either by concern that these deliveries might lead to war, or by Soviet pre-occupation with arms deliveries to India during the Indian–Pakistani war of 1971.[27] The Soviet Union was also careful not to supply some types of arms which could clearly have been used for offensive missions, such as the Tu-22 medium bomber armed with the *Kitchen* stand-off missile. These systems, and surface-to-surface missiles such as the *Scud*, may have been among the 'offensive' weapons included in arms agreements in early 1972, non-delivery of which was among the factors which caused the break in relations in July 1972.* On the other hand, weapons systems such as tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers (APC) were delivered in sizeable quantities. Last, the Soviet Union refused to transfer MiG-25 aircraft to Eygptian control. She did deliver some (in spring 1971) but they had Soviet pilots and were under Soviet control.[29]

The Restoration of the Soviet–Egypt Alliance: Its Effect on Arms Supplies

By February 1973, however, after several months of diplomatic activity, the Egyptian–Soviet semi-alliance was resurrected, and Soviet arms again began pouring into Egypt. They included tanks, *SAM*-6, the *Kelt* stand-off system (to arm the Tu-16 already deployed in Egypt) and *Sagger* anti-tank missiles. Perhaps the most significant weapons system sent to Egypt was the *Scud* surface-to-surface missile, some 30–48 of which were delivered prior to the 1973 war.[30] These missiles deterred Israel from deep-penetration bombing of the heart of Egypt in the 1973 war. Although their destructive potential was limited and the damage they could have inflicted on Israel would have been very small compared with what Israel could have done to the Egyptian infra-structure, Israeli policy-makers preferred to avoid mutual counter-value air strikes and to limit the activities of the Israeli air force on the Egyptian front to attacks on military objectives in the battlefield itself or its environs. It is possible, although by no means certain, that if the Soviet Union had not supplied these missiles to Egypt, Israel would have resorted to a counter-value strategy to 'punish' Egypt by destroying her economic and technological infra-structure. To some extent, therefore, by limiting the destructiveness of the war, the supply of the *Scud* missile by the Soviet Union constituted an arms-control measure. On the other hand, however, it strengthened Egypt's intention to start the war in the first place.

Soviet concern, over the years, about the possibility of a resumption of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States had some paradoxical consequences. The Soviet Union was ready to give arms to Egypt on occasion as a *quid pro quo* for an Egyptian agreement not to begin a war. Soviet deliveries of arms in March and April 1971, for example, were linked to an Egyptian undertaking not to seek a military solution. The Egyptian approach at the time was, in any case, to try to reach a 'political solution', and, during the first half of 1971 (and in varying degrees up to Spring 1973) President Sadat was interested in some kind of an interim agreement or other political move. The Soviet supply of arms at that juncture had the objective of encouraging a political approach as well as the more traditional objectives of gaining influence with the Arab countries and strengthening their capabilities.[31]

The American Position since 1967 and American–Soviet Contacts

Attempts to Promote Arms-control Measures

When the war broke out in June 1967, the United States imposed an embargo on supplies of arms to Israel, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco and Saudi Arabia, which was maintained until 24 October. She also took initiatives to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of arms supplies to the Middle East. On 19 June 1967 President Johnson outlined five principles for peace in the Middle East. These included a proposal that the United Nations should 'immediately call upon all its members to report all shipments' of arms into the area and should 'keep those shipments on file for all the peoples of the world to observe'.[32] At a special session of the General Assembly on the following day US Ambassador Goldberg submitted a draft resolution which proposed the achievement of 'a stable and durable peace' in the area 'through negotiated arrangements' on the basis of President Johnson's five principles, including 'registration and limitation of arms shipments into the area'. The Soviet Union opposed the American proposal, and the eventual resolution which was accepted did not refer to the arms-control clause. The Johnson proposal was also raised at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva by the Canadian delegate but it was not followed up.

Another attempt was launched at the highest level at the Glassboro meeting in June 1967 between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin. In the eleven-point proposal which the United States presented to the Soviet Union at this meeting, a special clause called for limitations on the arms race in the Middle East. The Soviet reaction was conditional; the Soviet Union was ready to participate in an arms-control regime, but only if Israel withdrew from the territories conquered in 1967.[33] Then in November 1967 the United States raised in the Security Council the possibility of limiting 'the wasteful and destructive arms race in the area'. The Soviet Union this time responded with a draft resolution urging both sides to limit their 'useless and destructive arms race', but again made her participation conditional on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the conquered territories. The basic political problems of the Middle East seemed more urgent, however, and neither superpower pressed its position. Instead they agreed to endorse Resolution 242, which did not include any reference to the arms race or to arms control.

American interest in an arms-control regime for the Middle East was probably based on the following considerations. The United States preferred not to become the main supplier of arms to Israel – a position she was likely to assume as a result of the French partial embargo – because that role would adversely affect her relations with the Arab countries. Second, immediately after the war and before the Soviet Union was able to re-equip the Arab armies, Israeli military superiority, which had been demonstrated by the war, was assured. According to American views at the time, this military superiority would have made it easier to try and arrive at a political settlement of the conflict acceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Third, the continuation of uncontrolled arms transfers to the Middle East would have enabled the Soviet Union to resume her influence in that area. Last, an arms race in the Middle East might again lead to instability and possibly to war.

A Change in American Policy

American efforts to reach some understanding with the Soviet Union on arms control in the Middle East continued throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s without, however, leading to an agreement. The United States, for her part, imposed at different times some limitations on her supplies of arms to Israel. Initially, as mentioned above, she imposed an arms embargo on all belligerents in the Middle East. Towards the end of 1967, however, American policy changed as a result of the French embargo on the delivery of the *Mirage V* to Israel, the possibility that this embargo might become total, and the massive transfer of arms from the Soviet Union to Egypt and Syria. At the same time the United States employed arms transfers as an instrument to pressurize Israel politically, as well as a tool in the continued bargaining process with the Soviet Union over possible arms control in the area. This strategy was most obvious in the case of the sale of F-4 *Phantom* to Israel. Israel asked to buy the *Phantom* in autumn 1967, but it was not until March 1968 that a tentative decision was taken by the United States to sell the aircraft. The decision was later ratified; the delay was apparently connected with American hopes that the Soviet Union would be ready to limit her own shipments of arms to the Arab countries.[34] Another consideration was probably the possible effects of the *Phantom's* appearance on the military balance in the Middle East. By mid-1969 (the War of Attrition had begun in March) the first batch of *Phantoms* appeared in Israel, and indeed their use – from January 1970 – in the deep-penetration bombing of

* Other reasons, probably as important, were dissatisfaction with the Soviet attitude towards a military operation against Israel, and tension between Egyptian and Soviet officers and officials which led to strong resentment among the Egyptians.

Egypt did destabilize the strategic balance between Israel and Egypt and eventually provoked Soviet military intervention in Egypt. These developments led the United States, in March 1970, to halt further supplies of *Phantoms* as a means of political pressure on Israel and also as part of an attempt to reach an arms-control agreement with the Soviet Union. Supplies were resumed after the August 1970 cease-fire.

The discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning arms-control agreements, which formed part of the negotiations for a settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict, remained unproductive. It appears that these discussions were preliminary, although most of them were held at the highest possible level, that of either the President in his contacts with the Soviet Union or the Kissinger–Dobrynin meetings.[35] The United States raised the problem from time to time and suggested extensive negotiations, while the Soviet Union held to the position she took at the Glassboro meeting and demanded a complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories as a prerequisite to an agreement. The official Soviet position was that, because the military balance in the Middle East was heavily tipped in favour of Israel, a precondition for stability in the region would be further military strengthening of the Arab side. The two super-powers were thus trapped by their commitments to their regional allies and held different views about a possible settlement of the conflict and about the nature of a stable balance of military capabilities in the area.

Following the cease-fire agreement of 1970, two further considerations influenced American policy concerning large-scale arms transfers to Israel. First, Israel was seen not simply as a local client to whom some American commitments had been made, but increasingly as a potential partner in the overall Western strategic posture in the Eastern Mediterranean.[36] The Israeli air force became an instrument which, in case of need, could be used as a local deterrent to limited Soviet involvement in the area. Military aid to Israel thus assumed a further dimension. Second, the United States reaffirmed her conviction that only an Israel that considered herself strong would be ready to make concessions, and thus American transfers of arms to Israel were necessary to stimulate Israeli confidence.[37] Indeed, in the short run, the considerable strengthening of Israel's capabilities deterred the Arab countries from resumption of military activity and secured some stability. To this extent its function was one of arms control. Yet war was not ultimately prevented, since the Arab states continued to resent Israeli occupation of the territories and they in turn accelerated the build-up of their forces.

The 1973 War and its Aftermath

The 1973 war further complicated the dilemma facing the super-powers in the field of arms control. During the war the super-powers undertook a massive effort to resupply the belligerents by air and sea. The American airlift began only after the Soviet airlift had started and after attempts to achieve a cease-fire had failed because of Egypt's rejection of the proposals. In their resupply efforts during the war and immediately after it, the super-powers were motivated primarily by their commitments to their local allies, whom they supplied with the weapons systems needed for the continuation of the battle. These included ammunition, spare parts, replacements for lost arms and also – primarily in the Israeli–American case – some new systems. The total tonnage delivered by airlift to Egypt, Syria and Iraq during 10–23 October amounted to approximately 12,500 tons. The sealift to the same countries during 7–20 October amounted to 63,000 tons.[38] Egypt and Syria received chiefly tanks, spare parts for all weapons systems, and SAM-2, -3, -6 and -7 launchers and missiles. Israel received aircraft, tanks (which in fact remained unused), ammunition (especially for artillery and tank guns) and electronic countermeasures which were used by the air force to suppress the Arab air defence systems. The new weapons systems they received were *Maverick* and *Shrike* air-to-surface missiles and *TOW* and *LAW* anti-tank missiles.[39]

Thus, during the war itself, the primary consideration of the super-powers was to aid their allies to achieve a military success. The United States tried by other means, however, to promote a measure of political stability, partly through preventing Israel from imposing total defeat on her adversaries. After the war, transfers of arms from the United States increased considerably, but even then some restrictions were imposed, and now and again the United States delayed the delivery of advanced systems in order to apply political pressure on Israel. The most obvious case was the reluctance of the United States to supply the *Pershing* surface-to-surface missile which was promised to Israel in September 1975 in the document *Assurances from USG to Israel*, which formed part of the package deal concerning the Israeli–Egyptian agreement.[40] Another restriction still applies to transfers of technology for advanced systems which Israel would like to produce herself. Both these restrictions are intended as measures of arms control.

The Super-powers and Nuclear Proliferation*

Both the United States and the Soviet Union regard nuclear proliferation in the Middle East as a threat to their national interests and this concern has informed their opposition to worldwide proliferation. The efforts of the United States to curb nuclear developments in Israel, which began as early as 1960, increased during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. (One of the results of her intensified demands was that American inspectors were allowed to visit the Dimona reactor twice a year.) The ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 created the impression that the problem of proliferation had found at least a partial solution, and that the super-powers' task would be to encourage or coerce non-nuclear powers to accede to the NPT. Although the prevention of proliferation remained high on the list of priorities of the super-powers, the level of activity surrounding the issue diminished. In the Middle East itself the tension which followed the 1967 war had almost completely absorbed the attention of both super-powers, although from time to time there were indications that both were worried about the possibility of proliferation in that area and would act to prevent it. The United States government asked Israel repeatedly but unsuccessfully to sign and ratify the NPT. Egypt signed the NPT but made ratification conditional on Israel's accession to it.

Indeed, it seems that Israel's considerations regarding her security needs, coupled with her concern about American political reaction and the possibility that the Soviet Union or another nuclear power would provide nuclear arms to Arab countries in response to Israel's producing such arms, have considerably affected the Israeli decision not to 'go nuclear'. It should, of course, be noted that the actual state of the Israeli nuclear programme is not fully known. Some sources have suggested that Israel has, in fact, already produced nuclear warheads and is adopting a strategy of 'a bomb in the basement'.† Others maintain that Israel has developed a 'high option' with a short lead time to the production of the bomb. Even if the first suggestion is true, Israel has not admitted to it, and a measure of ambiguity surrounds the existence of such a capability. Moreover, the deterrent effect of the 'bomb' on *limited* Arab attacks would be negligible. Indeed, if the Arabs did believe that Israel had nuclear weapons in 1973 – and their strategic planners probably applied a 'worst-case analysis' – the war would have been the first between two regional powers in which the attacker suspected that his opponent might use nuclear weapons. (The Chinese attack on the American forces in Korea was of a different nature, because the United States itself was not attacked.)

The strong political opposition of the super-powers to nuclear proliferation in the past is one of the reasons why it has been averted in Middle East. The nuclear field is thus an area in which some deliberate arms control has been applied by the super-powers. Lately there has been renewed interest in the United States in measures to prevent nuclear proliferation, stimulated partly by the growth in the uses of nuclear energy for energy production. First steps, such as a Suppliers' Conference, have already taken place.[41] It can be assumed that the super-powers, probably with the co-operation of other nuclear powers, will again become more active in taking measures to halt the proliferation of nuclear capabilities and in applying more stringent safeguards to the use of nuclear material.‡

* The position of the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons in the Middle East deserves a separate, extensive discussion. However, since the issue constitutes an important arms-control measure it is discussed briefly here.

† The last and most dramatic serious report, based on a Central Intelligence Agency source, appeared in the *New York Times* on 16 March 1976. A sensational story in *Time* magazine followed. The *Time* story claimed that Israel assembled thirteen nuclear bombs in the early stages of the 1973 war.

‡ The Carter administration has made non-proliferation one of its most important foreign-policy objectives.

Demilitarized Zones

The armistice agreements signed in 1949 between Israel and Syria and between Israel and Egypt stipulated the creation of very small demilitarized zones. There were several along the Israeli–Egyptian border. The experience with these demilitarized zones, especially the Israeli–Syrian ones, was highly unsatisfactory.[42] They became areas of continuous friction, and they were so small, in military terms, that their relevance and arms-control function was miniscule.

However, another *de facto* demilitarized zone did serve as a major arms-control measure. During the period 1957–67 (from Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai after the 1956 Sinai campaign until President Nasser moved his troops into the Sinai in May 1967), the Sinai was in fact partly demilitarized, though not through a formal agreement;[43] indeed, it was stated quite clearly that no such measure was agreed upon between Israel, the United States and Egypt during the negotiations on Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in 1956–7.[44] Rather, this limited demilitarization appears to have been the result of a unilateral decision by Egypt, prompted by her own security interests, which included, first and foremost, tacit recognition that a major military build-up, especially in the forward area of the Sinai, might invite a strong reaction from Israel. Although this has never been confirmed as official policy by Israel, two Israeli decision-makers, Yigal Allon and Shimon Peres, indicated in private statements that such Egyptian concentration would constitute a *casus belli*.[45] Moreover, the structure of the Israeli forces and their operational doctrine indicated that Israel would have to react by military means to Egyptian remilitarization of the Sinai. Second, Egypt probably recognized that it was cheaper and more effective to accomplish her military objectives by keeping the majority of Egyptian forces either around the Suez Canal or in the desert to the west. Third, in terms of defending the Egyptian heartland and the Canal area against outside attack, it was faulty strategy to deploy large units in the forward areas of the Sinai.[46] For one of the lessons learned in the 1956 war was that Egypt must be prepared for an attack not only from Israel, but also from other, outside, powers. Once Egyptian involvement in inter-Arab politics became very intense, there was an additional reason for keeping Egyptian forces close to home: they might be needed for overseas activities. This was fully demonstrated in the Yemen war which began in the second half of 1962.[47]

However, this partial demilitarization of the Sinai was very restricted in its application. In the first place, Egyptian regular troops were deployed throughout the Sinai during this period, although their *numbers* were very limited.[48] Second, and more important, Egypt had built an extensive strategic infra-structure in the Sinai which included airfields, supply depots and a forward system of defensive positions in the more important strategic areas close to the Israeli–Egyptian border.[49] The network of roads and water-pipes covering the Sinai desert made possible the quick build-up of a logistic system essential to large-scale forward deployment of troops. Furthermore, this road network enabled the Egyptian forces to move quickly from their permanent bases into the critical forward area. Third, there was no clear-cut indication of Israel's possible reaction in case of Egyptian violations in the Sinai. This ambiguity considerably reduced the credibility of Israel's deterrent capabilities. When on one occasion, in 1960, Egypt did move some forces into Sinai in order to deter Israel from attacking Syria, Israel partially mobilized her forces but relied on international diplomatic activity to defuse the crisis.[50] In any case, even Allon and Peres, in referring to the possibility of retaliation, mentioned only the concentration of troops along the Israeli–Egyptian border, and not the Egyptian military build-up inside the Sinai.

Another shortcoming of this limited demilitarization was the lack of any accompanying formal recognition. As a result there was no inspection system and, concomitantly, no international guarantees to prevent Egypt from moving large forces into the Sinai, nor was there even international acceptance of the fact that such a move would constitute a legitimate *casus belli* for Israel. Indeed, in 1967 the international community began to regard the situation as critical not when the Egyptian army began to concentrate near Israel's border, but only when the Straits of Tiran were closed.[51] Of course, Israel would almost surely have gone to war even without the closure of the Straits, because the deployment of large numbers of Egyptian forces close to her border over a long period of time placed her in an intolerable position.[52] It is conceivable, however, that the Egyptians could have moved forward as in 1960 (declaring as their motive the need to deter Israel from attacking Syria) but have refrained from closing the Straits; after a short while they could have retreated. In such circumstances Israel might not have gone to war at all, and the ambiguity concerning Israel's response to Egyptian violation of the military situation in the Sinai would have increased considerably.

These limitations on the efficacy of demilitarization notwithstanding, it did serve as a major arms-control measure. It diminished the possibility of direct contact between Israeli and Egyptian forces, thus decreasing the chances of accidental war or of escalation from a local military initiative. It added an important psychological barrier to any Egyptian decision to violate the *status quo* and supplied a crucial warning period.

The Israeli Counter-force Doctrine

Israel's small territorial base (until after the 1967 war), her reliance on the military reserve system and her need to terminate hostilities as quickly as possible led to the development of a tactically offensive operational doctrine. On the one hand, the small size of the country dictated the transfer of any battle to the enemy's territory. On the other, the need to terminate hostilities quickly was determined, first, by the limited economic resources of the country, and hence the necessity to demobilize the reservists at an early stage, and, second, by the assumption that outside powers would intervene shortly after a war broke out in order to enforce a cease-fire. This offensive operational doctrine was also connected with yet another tenet of Israeli strategy; namely, that the main objective of a war is the destruction of the enemy's forces to prevent the war from deteriorating into a static one of attrition. To achieve a quick, decisive victory, Israel had to concentrate her fire-power on the battlefield itself, and this led to the acquisition of weapons systems destined for a counter-force strategy and the avoidance of a counter-value confrontation. Thus, the Israeli forces developed over the years a strategy which had as one of its consequences an interesting arms-control implication: the avoidance of attacks on civilian populations and on the economic infra-structure of an opponent.

This concentration on the battlefield promoted development of an operational doctrine for the air force which concentrated primarily on attaining air supremacy (whether achieved through interception, dogfighting, or attacks on the airfields of the other side) and providing close support for the ground forces. The Arab side, for its part, made greater efforts to acquire counter-value systems. Egypt, for instance, acquired medium bombers (at a very early stage the Il-28,and later the Tu-16) destined primarily for such missions.

In late 1967 there were signs that Israel was beginning to make hesitant attempts at a counter-value strategy (one instance was the bombardment of the Canal cities in retaliation for the sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Eilat*,) but only in 1970 did she finally abandon her previous doctrine and resort to a combination of counter-force and counter-value strategies with the 'deep-penetration bombing' of Egypt. This was an exercise in coercive diplomacy with rather ambiguous political objectives. It destabilized the regional strategic relationship and, moreover, accelerated Soviet military involvement in the conflict. Israel began to rely more and more on a posture of 'deterrence by punishment', in order to dissuade Egypt and Syria from attempting to change the new *status quo* by force of arms, a policy based on increased general air superiority coupled with demonstrable bombing capability. This deterrence posture did not stabilize the situation or operate as an arms-control measure – as was proved by the outbreak of the October 1973 war. During the war Israel did resort to heavy bombing of the Syrian economic infra-structure. In the case of Egypt, however, a certain balance of mutual deterrence against attacks on civilian targets obtained, due possibly to President Sadat's threat that he would use *Scud* missiles against Israeli cities if Israeli aircraft attacked Egyptian cities and other targets in the heartland of Egypt.

Limited War in the Middle East as an Arms-control Measure

In differing ways all the wars between Israel and her Arab neighbours involved self-imposed restrictions which constituted arms control in the sense that the destruction caused by the wars

and their duration were limited. Even in the 1948–9 war, some constraints existed. One of the more interesting among them was the tacit understanding between Premier Ben-Gurion of Israel and King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan that actual fighting would be limited to the only area over which they had conflicting demands, Jerusalem and the road leading to it, and would not extend to other parts of the long front between the two sides. In 1956 the war was restricted to counter-force attacks, and only one Arab state participated. In the 1967 war the restraints were reduced, but again Israel avoided counter-value strikes. She also limited unilaterally the size of the territories occupied. In the 1969–70 war, the campaign was a static one and limited to the Canal zone. The restraint shown here by Egypt was, however, hardly of the 'arms-control' variety, but was prompted by a sober assessment of the weakness of her forces as compared with those of Israel. In the 1973 war, although they committed all their armed forces, the political, and hence military, objectives of Egypt and Syria were limited. This restraint was dictated primarily by the Arabs' perception of the capabilities of the two sides. As far as Israel and Egypt were concerned, there was a common desire to avoid counter-value strikes.

II. THE ARMS RACE

Arms Races and War: A Causal Relationship?

The relationship between arms races and war is a highly complex one and the following is a very brief treatment of an intricate subject.[53] Observation of arms races in the international system does not lead to the conclusion that there is by necessity a causal relationship between them and war. In theory, however, there are four situations in which arms races *per se* could aggravate conflict to the point of war: first, a build-up of arms by a party to a dispute who is determined to effect change and willing to resort to violent action to achieve his ends; second, an uneven arms race which might arouse suspicions about a possible change in the military balance caused by differing constraints on finance or manpower, and which could provoke a decision to launch a preventive war before the balance changed; third, the introduction of new and destabilizing weapons systems which would give an important advantage to the side which strikes first, and which would consequently motivate each side to be the aggressor;[54] fourth, the development of new-technology weapons systems, the relative performance of which is uncertain.*

In the Middle East, consideration of defence budgets and the actual transfer (and local production) of arms[55] permits the identification of five distinct periods:

(1) In the early 1950s there was some build-up of forces in the area but it was partially constrained by the external powers operating through the Near East Arms Co-ordinating Committee established by the Tripartite Declaration of 25 May 1950. Also, no imminent war was envisaged at that time.

(2) The second period was characterized by a sudden increase in the acquisition of arms. After some limited Israeli–French arms agreements in 1954 and 1955, the major change came in 1955 with the Soviet–Egyptian (officially called the Egyptian–Czechoslovak) arms deal. This acceleration continued during 1956, when both Israel and Egypt received large quantities of new weapons systems.

(3) The period between the end of the 1956 war and the outbreak of the 1967 war began with a significant reduction in defence budgets on both sides, as compared with the years 1955–6, but the arms build-up soon increased substantially. New weapons systems were introduced, and increasingly emphasis was placed on supersonic interceptors and fighter-bombers for the air forces and on more and better tanks for the ground forces. In terms of defence budgets as percentages of GNP, the growth was gradual: from about 8 per cent in Israel and 6 per cent in Egypt in 1957–8, to about 11–12 per cent in both countries in 1965–7. There was some levelling off during 1966–7 and, although there was an increase in the actual transfer of arms, it was evenly balanced.

(4) During the period between the 1967 and the 1973 wars the quantity of weapons supplied to both sides increased dramatically. Defence budgets increased to about 25 per cent in Israel and 20 per cent in Egypt in 1970. After the end of the War of Attrition (1969–70), there was again some levelling off, but the volume of arms transferred to both Israel and the Arab states continued to increase. A significant increase in supplies of arms to Egypt and Syria occurred during 1973. There were also major changes in the quality of weapons systems. The introduction of the F-4 added a new dimension to the Israeli air force, and Egypt and Syria acquired sophisticated surface-to-air missiles.

(5) The period between the end of the 1973 war and the present has been characterized by yet another significant increase in the quantities and quality of the weapons systems transferred to the local parties. In the first place there was a need to replenish the inventories of both sides after the war. Growth in arms and forces, as compared with pre-1973 levels, took place primarily in Israel and Syria.

Five major wars have been waged between Israel and one or more Arab countries – in 1948–9, 1956, 1967, 1969–70 (the War of Attrition) and 1973. A close examination reveals that only in 1956 were the dynamics of the arms race among the *primary* causes of war.

The 1948–9 war was caused by the direct clash between Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine following the 1947 UN partition vote. The Arab countries bordering on Palestine later joined the war for a variety of political reasons. In 1956 clearly a central cause of war was Israel's fear that the military balance between her and the Arab countries would shift to the advantage of the latter. This fear was kindled by the Soviet–Egyptian (Egyptian–Czechoslovak) arms deal of 1955. The 1956 war was, therefore, a typical preventive war, launched by a state fearful that the evolving arms race would disturb the *status quo*.[56] The war in 1967 had a number of causes, of which the arms race was not one. Once the crisis had begun, the behaviour of the two parties, Israel and Egypt, was determined by the dynamics of the situation itself. The Israeli decision to strike was finally provoked by the closure of the Straits of Tiran and, even more, by the concentration of Egyptian (and other Arab) forces along the Israeli border.[57]

The major Israeli victories over her adversaries in 1967 were followed by a long period of tension in the region. The Israeli military presence in the conquered territories was a source of great grievance to Egypt, Syria and Jordan which was quite separate from the general 'Palestine problem' and the ideological Arab rejection of Israel. The nature of the conflict was thus transformed and became much more critical. The 1969–70 War of Attrition was, therefore, a direct outcome of the 1967 war and its consequences. It was preceded by continuous violence on the 'Eastern front' (the Jordan River) and a short spell of violence along the Suez front. What is important to note, however, is that the direct cause was not a sudden and unexpected crisis, as in 1967, or a suspicion on the part of one side that the balance of power was liable to change, as in 1956, but an immediate and acute conflict of political interests. Again, the dynamics of the preceding arms race (which had escalated from 1967 onwards) were not the cause of the war, although they were a necessary condition for it. Egypt, the weaker side, would not have been able to start the war without massive Soviet arms supplies to help reconstruct her army.[58]

The 1973 war, which was the result of Arab distress at Israel's military presence in the territories,[59] was preceded by a substantial build-up of arms on both sides which had gone on since 1970 (with one exception, during the cooling of Soviet–Egyptian relations during July 1972–early 1973). From early 1973 onwards Egypt and Syria had accelerated their military preparations. Syria had increased her defensive capability, especially in terms of surface-to-air missiles. She relied more than Egypt on armour, however, to achieve her limited objective – regaining the Golan Heights.[60] The interesting feature of this build-up was that both Israel and Egypt accumulated those weapons systems in which they already had a qualitative superiority. Israel continued to acquire offensive systems, while Egypt, although she also accumulated a large inventory of tanks, strengthened her defensive systems (surface-to-air and anti-tank weapons). This imbalance eventually enabled Egypt to launch her 1973 offensive, in which she committed all her forces to achieving very

* For a counter-approach arguing that uncertainty about the performance of new-technology weapons serves deterrence, see S. J. Dudzinsky, Jr., and James F. Digby, 'New Technology and Control of Conventional Arms: Some Common Ground', *International Security*, Spring 1977, pp. 143–59.

limited geographical objectives while exploiting her local superiority in defensive systems. Thus the arms build-up, though not the primary cause of the war, affected the timing of the offensive, its scope and its type.

A consideration of the arms race over the whole period of the Arab–Israeli conflict shows that, with some variation, the military ratios were maintained throughout, and that Israel usually had some qualitative superiority over the Arab confrontation states. This was evident in some of the Israeli weapons systems, but much more in her individual fighters and her military organization as a whole.

As long as the territories are held by Israel, however, it seems that the political 'grievance' of Egypt, Syria and, to a lesser extent, Jordan, will provide a motive for any renewal of hostilities triggered by the Arab countries. The dynamics of the arms build-up will affect only the timing and scope of war. The Arab nations would probably resort to some type of military action even if the relative military capabilities of the two sides remained at their present levels and Israel continued to enjoy considerable superiority. If, on the other hand, a political solution were found and Israel returned most or all of the territories, it seems reasonable to assume that the probability of war would decrease considerably. The problem will persist, however, of how to increase strategic stability to match the relative political stability which will have been secured.

On the basis of the above brief analysis, it seems, in theory, that a symmetrical quantitative growth in the military capabilities of both sides (and thus the maintenance, more or less, of the existing numerical gap between them) will not of itself constitute an independent cause of war. It may become an important indirect cause if the arms obtained by the Arab countries have the capacity to frustrate vital Israeli weapons systems. The same applies if one of the sides (and especially the Arab countries) acquired a crippling first-strike capability or thought that they had acquired one. Also, the nature of the arms race has changed considerably because of the uncertainties associated with the performance of new weapons systems. The introduction of precision-guided munitions (PGM),* 'area weapons' and various counter-measures, for instance, have increased doubts about the relative capabilities of the two sides. In such circumstances the likelihood of instability may increase.

With respect to the economic situation of the regional actors, a roughly balanced curtailment of the arms race would certainly be crucial; Israel, Egypt and Syria can ill afford to go on arming at the current pace. It is true that, with the enormous increase in oil revenues, the Arab world as a whole has vastly greater financial resources than ever before, but the oil-rich states are not the confrontation states. The readiness of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to transfer funds to the confrontation countries is limited and is dependent on political decisions that might alter with a change in circumstances. Thus, it seems that the key adversaries in the conflict have a compelling interest in curtailing the arms race. Moreover, if either side (and especially Israel) perceives that it is 'losing' the race because of financial inferiority it might consider a preventive strike. In this case, the dynamics of the arms race would have served as a major cause of war.

The Arms Race since 1973

Despite the Israeli military victory in the 1973 war, there was a growing realization in Israel, and to a lesser extent in the United States, that it was necessary to increase Israel's military capability in relation to that of the Arab confrontation states. This was prompted by several considerations. First, it was necessary to augment Israel's military strength in anticipation of the political negotiations which were expected. Second, because of the relative success of the first stage of the Arab surprise attack in 1973, it was accepted by the United States that Israel would have to prepare herself for different types of wars in the future and would need wider margins of security than in the past. Third, the sphere of Israeli security interests was broadening The blockade of the Bab al-Mandeb in 1973 on the one hand, and the potential threats to Israeli sea lanes throughout the Mediterranean, in the Red Sea and possibly even around the Arabian Peninsula on the other, demonstrated the need for capabilities beyond those which were destined for a military campaign with the Arab confrontation countries alone.[61]

* For a definition and an analysis of their impact, see James F. Digby, *Precision-Guided Weapons*, Adelphi Paper No. 118 (London: IISS, 1975).

Fourth, the imbalance between Israel and the Arab countries from the point of view of manpower, economy and size, which became more evident during the 1973 war and its aftermath, dictated that Israel should equip herself with 'fire-intensive' weapons systems. These systems require large stocks of spare parts and ammunition, and the stocks would need to be maintained at a particularly high level, since a major resupply operation during a future war might encounter political difficulties. Last, the notion that only a strong and confident Israel would be ready to make political concessions again became prevalent. These factors seemed to carry more weight than arms-control considerations (even if the Soviet Union had agreed to an arms-control regime, something which was not likely in any case).

Israel's arms build-up after 1973 was marked. According to the former Israeli Defence Minister, Shimon Peres, Israel's overall military strength increased by about 30 per cent. Her tank force increased by 35 per cent, artillery by 25 per cent, the APC inventory by 60 per cent, combat planes by 15 per cent (or 35 per cent according to Yitzak Rabin, the Israeli Prime Minister) and war vessels by 45 per cent.[62] By the summer of 1975 the Israeli air force comprised 200 *Phantom*, 200 *Skyhawk* and a sizeable number of *Mirage* ('*Barak*') and *Kfir* fighter-bombers and interceptors.[63] Israel placed orders for F-15 and F-16 air-superiority fighters (she had already received the first deliveries of the former), various air-to-surface, surface-to-air and anti-tank PGM, and the Grumman EC-2 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The latter system is likely to increase the capability of the Israeli air force significantly. One of the lessons of the 1973 war was that an exclusive reliance on the tank is ill-conceived. Israel is now, therefore, attempting to implement a combined-arms approach.[64]

The level of arms transfers to both Egypt and Syria also rose considerably after the war. The Soviet Union sought to increase the military capability of her Arab allies in order to enhance their position in any political negotiations, and because there was always the possibility of a renewal of hostilities. Transfers of arms would also facilitate Soviet penetration into those Arab countries. However, the pattern of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union had changed. Shortly after the war it became apparent that Egypt had decided to reduce her reliance on the Soviet Union and to improve, instead, her relations with the United States. She quite quickly assumed an independent posture with pro-American undertones (a tendency which became stronger with every passing year). The Soviet Union reacted by slowing down the transfer of arms and eventually by limiting them considerably. To be sure, most of the losses suffered by the Egyptian forces were replaced, and indeed Egypt even received a new and very effective weapons system, the MiG-23 (some 48 of which have been delivered). Yet in other areas her level of arms remained similar to that of before the 1973 war. By 1974 Egypt was already looking for new sources of arms, first in Western Europe and, by 1975, in the United States as well.

The new search for arms indicates, in some respects, continued adherence to the strategy applied in the 1973 war; namely, reliance on elaborate air defence systems, infantry backed by armour, big concentrations of artillery and vast quantities of anti-tank weapons (preferably guided munitions). After replenishing her air defence systems from Soviet sources, Egypt is also building up her fighters-interceptor inventory by adding *Mirage* III (transferred from Saudi Arabia) and *Mirage* F-1 (ordered by Egypt and Kuwait, for transfer to Egypt). A large deal with Dassault for the purchase of *Mirage* F-1, some of them to be assembled in Egypt, is in the process of negotiation.[65] These acquisitions accord with the analysis suggested by General Mohamed Ali Fahmy: (1) increased importance of surface-to-air systems, coupled with intensification of the battle for air superiority; (2) increased importance of infantry; (3) diminished importance of the tank.[66] Other recommendations, which did not indicate a radical change from previous strategy, were improved command and control systems and a more significant role for surface-to-surface missiles. There are, however, some indications that Egypt is also searching for an added strategic option which would emphasize strike and offensive capabilities. A good example is her negotiations for the purchase of the British/French *Jaguar* strike-attack aircraft. It has been estimated that Egypt is aiming at orders in the range of 200 units.[67] Another effort is directed

at purchasing from France the *AlphaJet* (a Franco-German coproduction; the French version is of the close-support type, whereas the German one is a trainer).[68] Last, about half the MiG-23 referred to above are the ground-attack version.[69]

The build-up in Syria seems to have surpassed her capacity to absorb and deploy the arms supplied by foreign powers. Apart from replacing all the losses incurred in the war, Syria has also received 45 MiG-23 and has increased her air force and tank inventories considerably. New surface-to-air missiles have also been supplied to her.

Iraq and Libya have also received large quantities of arms. Among the new weapons supplied to Iraq is the Tu-22, which is capable of low penetration into Israeli air space. The deliveries to Libya far exceed Libyan capabilities, and in case of another Arab–Israeli war could be transferred to Egypt.

III. WHAT FUTURE FOR ARMS CONTROL?

The above account of the historical experience in arms control in the Middle East indicates the broad range of the subject. The following discussion suggests five possible areas for future arms-control measures, describes their main features and examines the variables which could affect them. The arms-control measures to be discussed are: (1) measures against surprise attacks; (2) de-militarization of buffer zones; (3) an agreement banning first use of force; (4) an agreement proscribing counter-city attacks; (5) limitations on the supply of specific weapons systems. Before proceeding, it is worth noting the issues which militate against the future application of arms control and those which may encourage it.

Factors Affecting Arms-control Measures

No adequate criteria exist for what constitutes a stable balance of deterrence based on conventional arms.[70] Concepts such as 'balance of power', which postulate parity in conventional capabilities, are vague and indeterminate, though the formulation of a definition for a stable 'balance of military power' in the Arab–Israeli region did pre-occupy decision-makers in Washington for quite some time. It has been suggested that an adequate criterion would be a quantitative ratio of hardware of one to three (or one to two, depending on the mix of systems) between Israel and those Arab states which may intervene in the war (Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia), allowing for changes in specific weapons systems and for the superior quality of Western aircraft and tanks supplied to Israel compared with Soviet arms supplied to the main Arab parties to the conflict, Egypt and Syria. Without other criteria, this could serve tentatively as a guideline for maintaining if not a balance (a very nebulous concept) at least a symmetrical growth of military capabilities between Israel and her adversaries. The quantitative criterion used until now rested on the assumption that Israel should, on the whole, receive systems which had a technological edge over those held by the Arab states. The difficulty in formulating such a criterion, however, indicates the need for focus both on *qualitative* limitations and on arms-control measures other than restrictions on the flow of armaments.

Hitherto, although the Arab 'forces in being' have been larger in terms of manpower and arms (even with all Israeli forces mobilized), Israel has had the advantage in the quality of some of her weapons systems and in intangibles such as morale, organizational ability, leadership and the capacity to decentralize command (which increases the flexibility of her forces and enables them to operate with much greater success in mobile warfare). These intangible advantages are difficult to quantify and hence to incorporate in an adequate model of stable mutual deterrence, as is the fact that account her geographical size, which has a bearing on her powers of deterrence.

There are, moreover, uncertainties about the future. To what extent would the confrontation states be ready to commit more of their resources of money and manpower to a further military conflict with Israel and, in particular, how far would the oil-rich Arab states (notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) be ready to transfer large parts of their vast financial reserves to the confrontation states? Doubt also surrounds the possibility of a more unified Arab command system and of changes in the intangibles on the Arab side. The implication of these uncertainties is primarily that, if there is any major change in these factors, it will probably result in a strengthening of the Arab position, and any formal agreement on limitation of the arms race should therefore anticipate the need for modification in the event of such a change.

Another problem is that the recipients of arms have always been able to exert considerable pressure on arms suppliers. As long as there is no fully co-ordinated joint policy on arms control binding all suppliers (primarily the United States and the Soviet Union, but also France and Britain), the regional powers may persist in applying pressure on each supplier individually. In addition, the supply of arms will continue to be viewed partly as an instrument for 'bribing' the local powers into accepting political conditions within the framework of future peace negotiations. There are two (preferably co-ordinated) ways to limit the effects of this problem: to negotiate a political settlement and to reach a suppliers' agreement on restrictions on arms transfers, which will take into consideration the recipients' strategic concerns. However, due to the sudden and dramatic increase in the financial resources available to the Arab oil-producing countries and the economic crisis in the developed world, which has stimulated efforts to export arms, the arms market has become a buyer's market.

One of the lessons learned from all the Arab–Israeli wars is the importance of surprise, first-strike and pre-emption strategies, particularly in the initial period of the campaign. Precisely this experience should therefore provide a focus for elaborate arms-control efforts. But, since the Arab–Israeli conflict is a many-sided one, the effect of some arms-control measures (for instance, the demilitarization of buffer zones) on Israel's relations with the different confrontation states will probably vary. One of the ways of overcoming this problem is through flexible limitations on deployment of forces beyond demilitarized zones.

Finally, there is an increasing capacity for indigenous arms production, both in Israel and in the Arab countries. Israeli production is the more notable. In 1975–6 she was already producing 30 per cent of her weaponry, and is now said to be self-sufficient in small arms, bombs, explosives, some types of guided missile and ammunition.[71] Guided missiles include the *Shafrir* air-to-air missile, the *Gabriel* sea-launched surface-to-surface missile and a development of the *Luz* air-to-air missile.[72] *Saar*-class missile boats are also in production.[73] In particular Israel is producing the *Kfir* fighter-strike aircraft,[74] of which only the engine (a General Electric J79) is currently produced under licence (about 40 per cent are still imported).[75] The Arabs, too, are attempting to develop an indigenous arms industry. Egypt has been trying various programmes since the early 1950s but with only very limited success. However, with the sudden huge increase in Arab financial resources, various ideas about an inter-Arab arms industry have emerged and, indeed, an Arab Defence Procurement Organization has been founded.[76] Separate negotiations with Britain and France over the creation of a defence industrial complex in Egypt are currently under way.[77]

This short account of the factors which could adversely affect arms-control efforts in the Middle East is disquieting. On the other hand, there are some elements in the situation which favour arms control as an important component in the political and strategic environment. Briefly, these are: (1) the experience with the demilitarization of the Sinai between 1956 and 1967; (2) the few tacit understandings concerning limitations on violence; (3) the recognition that war is of no political or strategic benefit to Israel (nor, probably, to the moderate Arab states either); (4) the obvious economic constraints on the principal participants in the arms race, which should direct them towards some tacit or explicit agreements about its limitation; (5) the acknowledgement that some arms-control agreements are a necessary part of any political settlement. This last has already been recognized by both sides in the three interim agreements of 1974 and 1975, which stipulated the creation of buffer zones, limitations on force deployments in specified areas, limitations on some weapons systems (surface-to-air missiles) beyond these areas and the formal creation of early-warning systems.

Measures Against Surprise Attacks

The value ascribed to surprise attacks in the Middle East is highly destabilizing.[78] In a crisis,

fears on both sides about such attacks grow markedly, increasing the likelihood of their occurrence. Measures taken overtly or covertly to avert the possibility of surprise attacks, which would reduce these fears and make crises more manageable, could be very efficacious. Two basic motives for a surprise attack can be postulated: first, to achieve a pre-emptive or anticipatory strike for narrow military-security purposes (almost invariably in a situation of crisis); second, to launch a premeditated strike out of the blue, the aims of which could embrace a multitude of strategic and political objectives. Whereas the first type would probably be directed primarily at the military forces of the opponent, the second might be a combination of limited or unlimited attacks on either military targets or social and economic targets, or a combination of both counter-force and counter-value attacks.

The objectives of surprise attacks would probably be different for Israel and the Arab confrontation states. Israel would probably be more inclined than the Arab countries to launch pre-emptive or anticipatory strikes; this would be particularly true if both sides' forces had already been mobilized – primarily because Israel relies much more than the Arab states on reserve forces, whose mobilization over a long period of time would create grave problems for her. However, Israel's reserve system would impose constraints on such an attack. As the majority of the Israeli forces are composed of reservists, no *large-scale* military ground operation could be conducted without them. Prior to the initial strike, therefore, Israel would have to mobilize a large part of her reserve forces, and this would serve as a warning to the Arab states. If mobilization took place, all the Arab armies would probably be put on alert, since no Arab state would be sure where the Israeli strike might fall. Thus, the only 'real' surprise attack from Israel could be an air strike, possibly coupled with a limited ground operation.[79] The situation, of course, would be different in times of crisis and when both sides had already mobilized their forces. Under those conditions Israel could launch a full-scale surprise, pre-emptive or anticipatory strike.

The likelihood of an Arab surprise attack would be higher, since the Arab states have standing armies. For sure, even the Arab armies could not launch an attack without extensive preparations, which could be monitored, but the significance of such preparations could be distorted more easily than in case of a large-scale Israeli mobilization.

A strategy aimed at diminishing the likelihood of surprise is required and should incorporate the following elements: the creation of demilitarized buffer zones and possible restrictions on the deployment of forces beyond buffer zones (discussed on pp. 19–21); more efficient intelligence and surveillance systems; the provision of information about the movements of forces, including military exercises;[80] greater invulnerability of essential military components; and a treaty proscribing the first use of force (discussed on pp. 21–22).

The Israeli–Egyptian agreements of January 1974 and September 1975 have already set a precedent in connection with intelligence-gathering and surveillance (to be discussed in p. 21), and these arrangements should serve as a model for future agreements between Israel and all her neighbours. Surveillance flights, conducted by both sides and by third parties which are guarantors of the agreements, should be allowed above both demilitarized zones and areas of restricted deployment. One possible procedure could be that every further agreement on limited Israeli withdrawal, which would (necessarily) stipulate demilitarization of certain areas, should also include clauses allowing for still wider areas in which surveillance flights were permitted. Any agreements about demilitarization of zones and restrictions on deployment of forces, or any independent agreements, could also include requirements for the continuous transfer of information about force deployments and military exercises. Military manoeuvres, for example, could be announced in advance, especially if they were to be carried out in areas adjacent to borders or in areas of restricted deployment. This information could be delivered directly to the other party or indirectly through a third party (such as the United States), and would also serve as a confidence-building measure.

The amount of information collected by Israeli intelligence is already considerable. Similarly, the Egyptians (and, by now, probably the Syrians) have received information about Israeli deployments through the Soviet-manned

MiG-25 reconnaissance flights over Israel. The transfer of information about military exercises need not, therefore, be considered a major innovation, though the sanction, by mutual consent, of some surveillance overflights and the transfer of information about military exercises may act as additional stabilizing measures. To facilitate the gathering of military intelligence, both sides would have to be supplied with the necessary systems, and agreements would have to be concluded about non-interference in intelligence gathering procedures.

Agreements about the issues discussed above – demilitarized zones, restrictions on deployment of forces beyond these zones, non-interference in intelligence-gathering, surveillance by third parties and transfer of information about military exercises – would be more effective if incorporated in formal treaties (as opposed to tacit understandings). Such treaties could define restrictions more clearly and accurately, would bar misunderstandings and would formalize sanctions. Although every agreement is vulnerable to violation, agreements are, nevertheless, important; they make violations somewhat more difficult and, more important, they modify the conduct of the parties as long as they are interested in the maintenance of these agreements. Moreover, if third parties (ideally the United States alone, but in some cases the Soviet Union as well) were to guarantee the system of arms control, formal agreements would become a necessity. Only explicit agreements could define the nature and scope of the guarantee and inhibit violations.

A new context of arms-control agreements and the gradual education of the regional powers in the nature of arms control would alleviate fears on both sides about the purpose of measures such as the hardening of military targets and the strengthening of the intelligence-gathering agencies, which would anyway be the likely results of any further unilateral action on each side.

Demilitarization of Buffer Zones and Restrictions on Deployment of Forces

The stabilizing role of the tacit and partial demilitarization of the Sinai in the strategic relationship between Israel and Egypt during the period 1957–67 has already been mentioned. The reasons why it was so central then still apply today. First among them is that a demilitarized Sinai would serve as an excellent buffer zone, providing both sides with an important strategic and tactical warning period after the indications of a surprise attack had been received. Some elaboration is required here. There are three types of indicators for a surprise attack: 'strategic' indicators, which signify intentions primarily, but sometimes also a general trend in the building up of capabilities; 'tactical' indicators, which warn of immediate preparations on the part of a suspected attacker; and 'real-time' indicators, which alert the attacked to an aggressor's violation of clear and pre-arranged lines. One of the lessons of the 1973 war was that both 'strategic' and 'tactical' warnings are potentially open to conflicting interpretations.[81] On the one hand, 'tactical' warnings may be ignored, as happened, for example, at Pearl Harbour and in the 1973 war; on the other, they may stimulate over-reaction on occasions when the preparations are only military exercises. The only adequate warning about an impending attack is the last type of indicator – and a demilitarized Sinai, penetration of which from either side would be unambiguous, would provide this facility, while eliminating the danger of over-reaction based on misunderstanding. (Israeli and Egyptian insistence on having early-warning stations which operate within the buffer zone created by the September 1975 Sinai agreement underlines their concern about surprise attacks.) Demilitarization of the Sinai, by physically separating opposing armies, would also contribute to stability by reducing the danger of accidental war, or of war caused by a series of miscalculations.[82]

Moreover, assuming that the two sides are not planning a military campaign against each other, there are some advantages for both in having the Sinai demilitarized, rather than policed by their own forces. From the Israeli point of view, if Egyptian forces invaded the Sinai with the intention of reaching the Israeli border (presumably the pre-1967 international border), they would have to accept the mode of battle best suited to the Israeli forces – a quick, mobile campaign. Israeli superiority in this type of battle has been proved in all previous Arab–Israeli wars. Further, if the Egyptian air defence system had to move with the attacking forces across the Sinai, the ground forces would be dispersed and fast-

moving, and hence would sacrifice integrated command and control as well as the aid of warning systems. In the 1973 war the effectiveness of the air defence systems of Egypt and Syria was partly due to their being concentrated in extremely large numbers in relatively small areas: in Egypt, mostly along the Suez Canal and around several important centres inside Egypt; in Syria, mostly on the Golan Heights and along the routes to Damascus. But if a battle raged throughout the Sinai, the Egyptian army would have to spread its air defence capability over an extensive area and would also have to defend its support columns throughout the area, which would probably reduce the effectiveness of the air defence system considerably. Under such conditions it is likely that the Israeli air force would be able to give efficient close support to their own ground forces and to harass and disrupt the 'tail' of the Egyptian forces.

From the Egyptian point of view, it is also arguable that the demilitarization of the Sinai would be preferable to the deployment of troops in the area. Two Israeli surprise attacks (in 1956 and 1967) have pointed to the vulnerability of an exposed forward Egyptian deployment. So long as there is no political settlement which resolves the problem of the territories, Egypt would like to have a credible military option against Israel and would probably prefer to deploy her troops in the Sinai, but the fear of an Israeli surprise attack on Egyptian forces close to the Israeli border would be increased. Two contingencies could provoke an attack by Israel: first, the concentration of Egyptian forces in the Sinai, an eventuality which Israel could not countenance without retaliation; second, a crisis between Israel and another Arab country (notably Syria), which could arouse Israeli fears that Egypt might decide to participate in a possible war.

The strategic advantages that both sides would gain from the demilitarization of the Sinai could stabilize the situation, since the difficulty and cost of an attack across the desert would act as deterrents, and demilitarization of the area – apart from reducing the threat of surprise attacks – would constitute an arms-control measure. The feasibility of an agreement on the demilitarization of the Sinai is, of course, in doubt. Indeed, Egypt has maintained that she is opposed to such an agreement. At the same time, she has indicated some readiness to accept the demilitarization of part of the Sinai, provided Israel undertook to demilitarize an approximately equal strip of land inside Israel (within the pre-1967 border).[83] This, of course, is unrealistic. Demilitarization would only be effective if it covered the entire Sinai Peninsula, creating a broad buffer zone (possibly with the exception of a narrow strip similar to the one created under the 1975 agreement, in which *limited* Egyptian forces are deployed for the purposes of the immediate defence of the Canal works and cities). Besides, since the Sinai is about three times the size of the whole of Israel, equivalent demilitarization inside Israel would clearly be impossible. From the point of view of arms control, a large buffer zone between the two sides is essential, and the Sinai is eminently suitable for that purpose, being almost uninhabited and having already been partly demilitarized, during the period 1957–67.

The advantages to be gained from the demilitarization of the Sinai have convinced the United States in the past that it would have to be an essential component of any political settlement. It appears that the Egyptian government may become more amenable to such an idea. Indeed, there was some indication of that during the negotiations preceding the September 1975 interim agreement, when Egypt agreed, to some demilitarization provided the term used was 'limited zone', 'zone of limited forces' or something similar. The same approach could be employed in any future negotiations. Israel, for her part, considers the demilitarization of Sinai a *sine qua non* in any final settlement with Egypt.

An important model for future agreements concerning the demilitarization of Sinai is the September 1975 interim agreement between Israel and Egypt, which stipulated four central and significant arms-control measures: (1) the creation of a demilitarized buffer zone between Israeli and Egyptian forces; (2) limitations on the deployment of manpower and weapons systems in areas contiguous to the buffer zones on both sides; (3) the creation of early-warning systems controlled by Egypt, Israel and the United States; (4) the introduction of American personnel (the American role will be discussed in Chapter IV).

The first two measures were framed in the Sinai 'disengagement' agreement of 1974. Changes were made in the 1975 agreement only to the location of the buffer zone and the areas of limited deployment. The third component had a limited precedent in the 1974 agreement, but the September 1975 agreement goes much further; in addition to allowing for mutual surveillance overflights, it provided for the establishment of a more elaborate warning system to serve the two sides. According to the agreement, Israel and Egypt were each to control one surveillance and intelligence station inside the buffer zone. Apart from their importance as a further means of surveillance, the new stations inhibited violations of the agreement, since personnel on both sides would be exposed in event of a sudden outburst of hostilities and hence would become *de facto* hostages. The buffer zone created by the agreement is relatively narrow but, considered together with the areas of limited military deployment, its significance in providing for a warning of threatening moves, and therefore its importance as an arms-control measure, increases. The agreement, however, allowed the Egyptian forces to 'tail' withdrawing Israeli forces, a provision which has reduced the efficacy of the buffer zone and created an alarming precedent. Instead of widening the zone defined by the 1974 agreement to cover all the ground evacuated by the withdrawing Israeli forces, Egyptian forces were allowed to enter and occupy part of it. The buffer zone was thus 'moved' and, in the process, somewhat enlarged. Obviously, this provision must not be included in any future agreements, for it would violate the principle of the demilitarization of the Sinai.

Since the West Bank and the Golan Heights are much narrower than the Sinai, the effectiveness of their demilitarization as a measure against surprise attacks is far more limited. In the case of the West Bank, some Israeli forces could be deployed in the Jordan Valley for a period of time. In addition – or alternatively, if the former is not politically feasible – deployment of forces beyond the demilitarized buffer zone should be restricted. As a third measure Jordan should undertake not to allow the presence of Arab forces in Jordan. Since the Israeli army depends primarily on reserves, whereas the Arab forces, although they contain many reservists,* primarily comprise standing armies, restrictions on deployment would have to be directed principally at the Arab armies. To resolve this dilemma, Israel should undertake not to mobilize significant parts of her reservists. The Golan Heights would pose a particular problem for Israel. Because they are a high plateau with easy access from the Syrian side, Syria is in a much better position to reoccupy them in a surprise move. The need to restrict deployment of forces beyond buffer zones is therefore especially critical in their case. The objective should be to restrict the number of Syrian forces and the kind and number of weapons systems deployed along the demilitarized Golan Heights. Even with such restrictions Syria would still be in a position to move into the area, using forces deployed in other parts of the country; nevertheless, limitation on Syrian deployment would partially reduce Israeli anxieties about a surprise Syrian move into the Heights, while it would not pose serious security risks for Syria. Weapons systems restricted on the Syrian side should be primarily of the offensive type – tanks and self-propelled guns. A major point of debate in future negotiations about such an agreement would probably be restrictions on surface-to-air systems. It is likely that Israel would argue that such systems serve as an umbrella for an attack, while Syria would maintain that such systems are needed for the defence of her normally deployed forces.

'No First Use of Force' Treaty (NFUFT)[84]

Such a treaty should essentially be aimed at repudiation by both sides of the use of force and should emphasize other means for the resolution of outstanding contentious issues. It would necessarily ban surprise attacks, and would probably be strengthened by the inclusion of a provision allowing both sides to demand information about threatening concentrations of forces.

What could be the real effect of such an agreement? Three advantages could be gained.

* Although Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq between them have as many as 1,000,000 reserve soldiers, these could not be compared with Israeli reservists. There is no mechanism for their periodic training, their mobilization takes a long time and their effectiveness in combat is highly debatable.

First, it would serve to silence Arab calls for a resort to force in order to eliminate Israel. Second, it would raise Israel's costs, in political terms, if she decided to resolve a crisis by force. Third, it would have a stabilizing effect on inter-Arab relations. It is reasonable to assume that if one Arab state decided on war against Israel, it would try to persuade others to join in, since no Arab country could hope, in the foreseeable future, to wage war on Israel by itself. The treaty could inhibit spontaneous alliances of this kind, because only two main strategies would be open to a single belligerent Arab state: to establish the alliance before war was declared, or – if other Arab countries refused – to launch an attack on the assumption that they would find it impossible to stay out of the war once it had started. The latter strategy involves two grave risks. One is that the other Arab countries – or country (Egypt, probably, if Syria were making these calculations) – would not join in the war, which would be conducted without the participation of those Arab states considered essential to its success, and Israel would probably win. The second risk is that, even if the other Arab countries found it difficult to avoid involvement, their moves would be slow – either deliberately or for reasons such as problems with fast mobilization – and, again, an Israeli victory would be likely.

The NFUFT would add an element of uncertainty to the calculations of every Arab state which considered an attack on Israel, and would affect its deliberations about the possible success of the war in terms of relative gains and costs. A decision to abrogate a formal agreement requires some effort, and, as this difficulty is apparent to all the regional powers, they would be forced to conclude that parties to the agreement would find it particularly difficult to abrogate it in the context of the threat of war between an Arab state and Israel. Indeed, this uncertainty is already affecting Syrian policy: the Egyptian undertaking in the 1975 interim agreement not to 'use force' against Israel (an undertaking which is understood to be binding for three years and to be valid – according to certain of President Sadat's speeches and interviews – only in the case that Israel is not the first to use force herself) is a factor which Syria has to take into account when she considers her strategy.

The agreement would also embrace contingencies which are not covered by existing agreements on demilitarization of zones, such as sea and air attacks outside the buffer zones. The NFUFT should not, however, refer to reactions to grave violations of other formal arms-control agreements, such as demilitarization of zones. If one side abrogated an important part of an arms-control agreement, the aggrieved party should have the option of punitive or compensatory military reprisals.[85]

'No Counter-city Attacks' Treaty (NCAT)

In the wars of 1956 and 1967 military operations were limited to the battlefield; almost no counter-value strikes were registered, although one major exception was Jerusalem in 1967, when civilian targets (mainly Israeli) were shelled. This limitation on the use of force was primarily the result of a conscious Israeli decision rather than a tacit undertaking by both sides; in fact, since the Arab countries lacked a counter-value military capability (their air forces had been destroyed or lacked penetrability), any decision to rule out attacks on civilians had to be an Israeli one.

The wars of 1969–70 and 1973 followed the same pattern, with two major exceptions: in the first war, Israel began, after a while, her deep-penetration bombing of Egypt, while in the second, the Israeli air force imposed severe punishment on the economic infra-structure of Syria. Almost all the Arab states refrained from counter-city attacks, a decision probably prompted by an acknowledgement of the superiority of the Israeli air defence system (based primarily on interceptors). Shortly after the 1973 war ended there were brief press reports that Israel and Egypt were interested in arriving at some kind of understanding about proscription of counter-city attacks. Israel has always been worried about casualty levels and about attacks on her civilian population. Egypt, for her part, has already experienced harsh treatment at the hands of the Israeli air force, and her capacity to protect her skies effectively and, more important, to penetrate Israeli air defences (without surface-to-surface missiles) is very uncertain. Israel also shares an interest in reaching agreement about counter-city attacks with Syria and Jordan. Syria could possibly be in a position to deploy a large number of surface-to-surface missiles (supplied by the Soviet Union) capable of penetrating Israeli airspace, but such an attack would be followed by terrible punishment of Syrian cities, which could bring about the fall of the regime. On the other hand, while Israel could probably defend herself against penetration attempts by Syrian bombers, it would be impossible for her to deploy an anti-missile system, and the only way to eliminate such a threat would be by a pre-emptive strike at Syrian missile launchers. Moreover, the diversion of military capabilities from the battlefield to either air defence or attacks on civilian targets could be counter-productive. The case of Jordan is different, since she has no capability for attacks on the Israeli civilian population. At the moment she does not have any effective air defence either, but this situation will almost certainly change within the next five years or so with the introduction of an American air defence system. Attacks on Jordanian cities, if they were defended by an elaborate air defence system, could be costly, and the military gains would at best be debatable. Thus, Jordan will eventually be able to count on air defences to provide a basis for her inclusion in an agreement banning counter-city attacks.

Discussion of agreements concerning counter-city attacks raises certain questions. How effective could they be as deterrents? What restrictions should they impose on attacks on different types of target? Would their purpose best be served by the deployment by both sides of offensive weapons systems? What purpose would an agreement serve?

NCAT as Deterrent

Whether agreement were reached or not, would the threat of counter-city attacks deter either side (especially the Arab countries) from another war? The answer is probably, no. The Israeli threat of punishment prior to the 1973 war did not deter Egypt and Syria from an attack, and such threats will probably be as ineffectual in the future. Indeed, with the increased effectiveness of surface-to-air systems, the cost of counter-city attacks, unless conducted with surface-to-surface missiles, will inexorably rise, and even surface-to-surface missiles are too expensive to be cost effective for massive counter-city offensives. Further, those which are not terminally guided are rather inaccurate, whereas those which are precision-guided are expensive and could more effectively be used against military targets.

The main point, however, must still be that attacks against civilian populations do not seem to have the psychological effect which would justify them. This has been proved in one international war after another, and it does not appear that the experience in the Middle East is any different, in this sense, from those of Europe or Vietnam. It might be argued that Arab societies are more likely to disintegrate in the face of large numbers of casualties and destruction caused by massive air attacks. However, the experience of one Middle Eastern country – Lebanon – has illustrated that factions will continue with bitter and strenuous fighting, without loss of morale, in spite of huge numbers of casualties (official Lebanese estimates put them as high as 60,000 killed in a year and a half, most of them civilians), damage to property and complete dislocation of normal life. Similarly, although Israel is very concerned about casualties, it is unlikely that civilian losses would affect her resolve to go on fighting – indeed, it would probably strengthen it.

It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that counter-city attacks would only arouse deeper feelings and tougher resolve on both sides. Moreover, since most Arab–Israeli wars are short, given the strong likelihood of super-power intervention, the debilitating effects of a long period of counter-population strikes are unlikely to be experienced by either side. For these reasons it would appear that if a strong political or strategic incentive did exist for starting a war, the threat of severe civilian casualties and damage to property would not act as a deterrent.

Targets: Some Suggested Restrictions

The second question is whether a NCAT should cover only cities and civilian populations or all social and economic targets. Two kinds of limitation on military strikes could apply. First, a geographical distinction could be made between targets located away from civilian population centres, those near them and those near the front line – although military targets located inside major cities could raise complications in this context. Second, different types of target could be distinguished: for example, purely military targets, such as military airfields, camps

and ports, and those targets which serve peaceful or joint military-civilian purposes, such as refineries and transport links.

Because of the ambiguities associated with those targets which have both military and civilian uses, it would seem advisable to treat these as a special category in an agreement. But this would create other problems. For example, one of the main concerns of the combatants in any future war – and especially in a war of attrition – will be to maintain their resupply systems, which will depend on their transportation channels, including airfields, ports, railways and roads. The exclusion of such objectives from military strikes would affect Israel particularly, since she is more vulnerable to high attrition rates and yet has the capability to strike at the transportation system of her opponent.

The other possibility is to limit military strikes to a narrow zone near the front line. In this context it is worth pointing out that the main battlefield of the future would in all probability be the Sinai. Since this barren piece of land is almost uninhabited, it would be easier to leave it completely 'open' to military actions and to prohibit military strikes beyond it. This, again, might raise problems. To begin with, part of the logistic systems of both Israel and Egypt extend beyond the Sinai and could be considered purely military targets. Military ground operations, too, could extend beyond the Sinai. What limitations could be imposed then? What about 'pure' military targets, such as military airfields and harbours?

One possible solution is to combine parts of the two criteria: for example, to ban strikes beyond the Sinai and the Golan Heights, though allowing strikes in a limited zone which 'moves' with the front line, but to exclude from the ban all purely military targets, wherever situated. One of the difficulties raised by this solution is that many military targets are located near or even in the midst of civilian centres. Mistakes in guidance might lead to civilian casualties and frustrate the whole intention of the agreement. One of the technical ways to overcome this is by extensive use of long-range PGM, which can hit military targets without collateral civilian damage, but this option would still leave several problems unsolved. For one thing, some PGM might go astray and hit civilian targets, which could lead to a reaction in kind and the possible collapse of the whole system. For another, long-range PGM could be used for a first strike against military targets and thereby threaten to undermine another important possible arms-control system – measures against surprise attacks.

Offensive Weapons Systems: An Alternative Strategy?

A third problem concerns the question of whether the purpose of the agreement could best be served by mutual deployment of offensive weapons systems with a counter-city capability (for instance, long-range surface-to-surface missiles armed with anti-personnel area weapons). Such deployment could act as a deterrent to counter-city attacks by posing a credible threat of retaliation in kind, thus leading to what some would maintain was a stable mutual deterrence system. To the extent that such a capability exists anyway, it is possible to argue that it would be better to increase the scope of such deployments – indeed, to add new systems to each side – so that a counter-city strike launched by one side would lead not just to limited retaliation but to a large-scale – and, measured in military terms, unnecessary – destruction on both sides.

In the nuclear relationship the existence of offensive systems which are capable of penetrating the airspace of the opponent and causing tremendous destruction is essential for the stability of the strategic balance. This is so because in the gains/costs calculations of each side the risk of a global nuclear war would be so much greater than any possible gain from a military attack that neither side would contemplate launching one. In a conventional relationship, however, the certainty of causing damage is much less and the scale in any case infinitely smaller, so that the element of deterrence is much weaker. Moreover, if the systems exist and are deployed, the inclination to use them for counter-city missions would be intensified in the following cases: at times of reversals on the battlefields; if one side assumed that there was just enough time to launch a limited counter-city attack before a cease-fire was imposed; if it was assumed – correctly or incorrectly – that the other side had lost its capability to launch a retaliation in kind, having used up these systems in counter-force missions.

At present the Israeli air force is in a much better position to penetrate the airspace of an adversary than are the air forces of the Arab states. However, with the deployment of denser and more sophisticated surface-to-air systems around the Arab centres of population, superiority will be somewhat reduced, and although the Israeli air force could still penetrate these defences, it is questionable whether this would be the most cost-effective use of Israeli aircraft. An increase in air defence systems deployed around civilian population centres would therefore serve the purposes of arms control in the Middle East.

The introduction of long-range surface-to surface missiles, on the other hand, could lead to anxieties about their eventual use in a counter-city role, and limitation on their deployment should therefore be one of the objectives of arms control. Fortunately, if an agreement along these lines were to be reached, it would be relatively easy to monitor compliance. Moreover, since the local powers are still dependent on external suppliers for these systems, control could be exercised over their transfer.

The Uses of a Formal Agreement

The last question concerns the utility of a formal agreement. It seems that the most important elements in non-counter-city strategy are the weapons systems deployed and the strategic policies adopted by both sides. If each side planned and prepared for concentration on the battlefield, this would have greater impact than a formal agreement on the conduct of war. An agreement, however, would serve a useful function. To begin with, the negotiations would have an effect on the military bureaucracy of both sides, since an agreement is not usually repudiated immediately after signature, and would have to be taken into consideration by the party. Once some planning based on the probable outcome of the negotiations had taken place, inertia would set in which would be difficult to overcome. A formal agreement would also supply a framework for limitations on the supply of weapons systems to local parties.

Agreements to Curb the Arms Race: Likelihood and Efficacy

The United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain – the 'Big Four' – control among them about 90 per cent of the international trade in arms. They are, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, the main suppliers of the Middle Eastern countries. A consideration of the arms race in the Arab–Israeli region and of the various measures applied over the years for its limitation reveals that the recipients of arms – when they have recognized their security to be at stake – have been able to apply considerable pressure on their suppliers to provide many of the weapons needed. The super-powers (primarily the United States) have been ready and able to resist this pressure, but in most cases only for a limited period, occasionally measured in years. Eventually they have acquiesced in many of the recipients' demands, either because they have acknowledged their needs or because of a desire to extend influence. Although the suppliers' resistance to demands for arms has generally contributed to stability in the region, their imbalanced response to these requests have at times aroused anxiety on the part of the recipients, which has led, in turn, to an acceleration of the arms race.

To obviate the uncertainties and possible delays associated with supplies of arms from the super-powers, two expedients are ostensibly available to both sides in the Middle East. One is to develop indigenous production, the other to find alternative sources of arms. Israel is in a better position to rely on an indigenous production base; while the Arab countries are planning to develop production, they nevertheless lag far behind in this field and any such base will probably take a very long time to materialize. On the other hand, the Arab states, because of political factors, are more able to diversity their source of arms. The Arab oil countries are also capable of applying economic pressure on their suppliers, either through threats to link the supply of oil to transfers of arms or by their generally strong economic position. However, while economic considerations have had a powerful influence on arms exports generally in the last few years, particularly in the cases of Britain and France, the new phenomenon of the petro-dollar has encouraged the United States to exchange her relatively restrictive policy of the post-World War II years for a more flexible one, similar to that of the 1930s, which has been most evident in the Persian Gulf. Although other countries are now entering the international arms

market, it appears that the Big Four will remain the main sources of arms for the Middle Eastern countries for some time, particularly in the case of the more important weapons systems.

Indeed, with specific regard to some extremely important high-technology weapons systems, such as air-superiority fighters, new-generation tanks and possibly some third- and fourth-generation PGM, only the super-powers will be able to maintain their exclusive position. (For example, evidence suggests that France and Britain are not planning an air-superiority fighter to compare with the F-15, F-16 or F-18, and, although West Germany is developing a new-generation main-battle tank, the *Leopard II* – many of the parts for which will be standardized with the American XM-1 – it seems unlikely that she will become a supplier of arms to the Middle East.) Furthermore, although the technology for the development of PGM is not always highly complex at present, it could be argued that the technological requirements for future generations of some types of PGM would be so demanding that only the super-powers would produce them. Finally, given the high rate of attrition likely in another Middle East war, the regional powers must plan to rely on external suppliers who will be capable of transferring large quantities of arms, ammunition and spare parts quickly. This condition could only be met by the super-powers. A measure of dependence on the super-powers will therefore persist for other weapons systems as well as for high-technology ones. This exclusive position could guarantee that, if some arms-control agreements were concluded between the super-powers, they would be in a position to exert pressure on the recipients of arms and perhaps also to contain the exports of the other two major suppliers. The readiness of the suppliers to agree to such measures is, of course, an open question.

Arms Limitation: Conditions for Success

Two types of agreement on the limitation of arms transfers can be suggested: (1) agreements among suppliers, initiated and ratified by themselves; (2) agreements among suppliers and recipients, initiated by both parties, which clearly do not adversely affect the security interests of the recipients in their own eyes. International suppliers' agreements concerning the control of the flow of arms, particularly in the context of the Middle East, have seldom been successful unless accompanied by agreements with the recipients.[86] Given the relative power of the recipients in the Middle East and the political gulf which separates their main suppliers, the importance of the recipients' initiatives are more crucial than in other areas of the world. Indeed, one observer, commenting on the problems of regional arms-trade limitation agreements, suggested that four factors were essential to their success: local initiative; a common background and attention to arms control; a community framework and identity; and a conjunction of interests, such as the reduction of arms expenditure.[87]

The acceptance by Middle Eastern countries of agreements constraining the flow of arms will probably come about when: (1) the political climate is considered to have improved, or at least to be unlikely to engender imminent war; (2) the possible limitations suit the strategic doctrines of the recipients; (3) a measure of confidence exists, so that recipients could rest assured that if one supplier abrogated an agreement and sent arms to one side, the other supplier would transfer similar (or cancelling) weapon systems to the other; (4) the system of control provides enough flexibility to allow for periodical reviews of the security needs of the recipients; (5) the limitations harmonize with other arms-control measures; (6) some credible verification is obtainable.

As far as the second type of agreement is concerned, tacit communication between the two sides would be necessary. Indeed, one cannot overstate the importance of this particular condition, since the defence establishments of both sides would only accept limitations if they were convinced that agreements among suppliers would not negatively affect the security interests of their countries. It will take an enormous effort to arrive at agreement between the super-powers on arms control: if an agreement adversely affected the security interests of either side, it is highly doubtful that it could be stable or lasting.

Would a political settlement by itself, without collateral agreements on limitation of arms supplies, bring about some de-escalation of the arms race? It appears likely that if a political settlement were reached, the arms race in the

Arab–Israeli region would slow down, and the main participants would gradually reduce their investment in defence. This reduction, however, would not necessarily be structured according to arms-control reasoning, so qualitative or quantitative limitations, or both, would need to be recognized by both sides. Needless to say, the best solution would be to combine both types of limitation, but if a choice has to be made, the qualitative approach should be preferred.

The most likely candidates for inspection and verification under an arms-limitation agreement would be those weapons systems which do not as yet exist in the inventories of the recipients, or exist only in small numbers, and the producers of which are limited. In this context, it should be noted that although the new air-superiority fighters, which are on order but have not yet been delivered, are not necessarily a threat to stability, the situation is different in the case of such weapons systems as surface-to-surface missiles with ranges which could include population centres, long-range PGM (including cruise missiles) and 'area weapons'. Careful attention should be paid to these systems to find out whether their acquisition would be destabilizing and, if so, to try to limit their introduction into the Middle East, even if they are on order or have already been introduced in small numbers. The criteria for limitations on such systems should be determined by previous decisions on issues such as the demilitarization of buffer zones and the prohibition of counter-city attacks. The availability of long-range PGM, for example, could increase motivation to strike first. Similarly, the transfer of 'area weapons', which could have a high counter-city effect might undermine agreements to ban such attacks.

Short-Range PGM and the Balance

There has recently been wide-ranging discussion of the role of short-range PGM (of the anti-tank and anti-air varieties).[88] What has been their impact on the strategic balance in the Middle East and how are they likely to affect stability there in the future?

The answers to these questions are complex and equivocal. The first problem concerns their proven effectiveness. For the purposes of this Paper, the experience of the 1973 Middle East war, when PGM were first introduced on a large scale, appears not to be conclusive. In the first place, the PGM used belonged, apparently, to two different generations. The *Sagger* and *Snapper* anti-tank weapons used by Egypt and Syria could be defined as primitive, first-generation PGM; the surface-to-air missiles used extensively by the Arab states, the 'stand-off' systems used on a small scale by the Israeli air force and the *TOW* anti-tank missiles used on only a few occasions by Israeli ground forces belonged to a more advanced generation. Second, in the early stages of the war the Israeli air force lacked even the more traditional electronic counter-measures against surface-to-air missiles in any significant quantity, and had only a very limited number of air-defence-suppression missiles. It could, therefore, be argued that had the planes carried these more advanced systems, Arab surface-to-air missiles would have been less effective. Third, Israeli ground forces, in the first stages of the war, did not employ the all-arms tactics necessary for the suppression of the Arab anti-tank systems. The combination, traditional since World War II, of tanks, armoured infantry and artillery was neglected in favour of self-contained tank forces,[89] and it could be argued that many of the tanks hit by PGM need not have been lost. On the other hand, more advanced PGM could have caused more damage to Israeli armour. Although there has, as yet, been no definitive test of PGM, most observers would agree that anti-tank and anti-air PGM could change the face of the battlefield considerably and substantially increase the attrition rate of an enemy's attacking units. What would be the consequence of this higher attrition rate? Again, the majority of observers argue that it would favour the defence as opposed to the offence.[90] There is, however, serious disagreement over the extent of this change in the balance and whether or not it has already taken place. A minority contends that the traditional offensive systems, primarily tanks and fighter-bombers, are still the most important weapons systems and would be able, in conjunction with appropriate counter-measures, to overcome the defensive PGM.[71] But even they agree that offensive missions might become more expensive, and if this were the only outcome of the introduction of precision-guided missiles, considerations of expense would militate against decisions to launch offensive operations.

In the Middle East the introduction of PGM, with their effect on the balance of offence and defence, would not necessarily reduce the risk of war. If, for example, no buffer state existed between Israel and the Arab states, the latter might be encouraged to launch a limited offensive with very limited military objectives (as was the case in the 1973 war). The action would be aimed at gaining a narrow strip of land by a surprise attack, thereby forcing Israel to launch a major offensive operation which the defensive systems of the Arab states would be able to withstand. Thus, some limited offensive military operations would, in fact, be enhanced by a change in the balance between the offence and the defence. However, even in the Middle East, such a change could encourage each side to believe that attack from the other was less likely, and might, under some conditions, diminish the likelihood of war. For example, if a political settlement were reached which included major Israeli withdrawals from the occupied territories and their demilitarization, short-range anti-tank, surface-to-air and 'stand-off' air-to-surface PGM might assist the defensive capabilities of both sides without creating conditions conducive to limited attacks, and offensives on a more ambitious scale would certainly become more difficult. Surprise attacks across a demilitarized Sinai would be hazardous and less likely: if one did occur, an aggressor, having crossed the desert, would find himself facing an opponent who was heavily armed and in an environment favourable for close air support for his forces. The problem of penetrating an elaborate and flexible defence equipped with highly accurate weapons would compound the difficulties of the attacker, who would have had to cross large areas of desert with lengthening communication and supply lines. Furthermore, the attacker's troops would be more vulnerable to his opponent's air force, because the surface-to-air PGM systems are most effective in an operation covering the whole air space at varying heights above the battleground. This can be best achieved when the surface-to-air systems are stationary: when on the move, in battle conditions, their co-ordination is considerably hampered. (This analysis of the relative performance of the surface-to-air and air-to-surface 'stand-off' systems applies primarily to confrontations between the Israeli air force and the Egyptian air defence system. The advantage to the defender would not be apparent, however, in the case of the demilitarization of the West Bank and the Golan Heights. There the potential contribution of short-range PGM to arms control is not clear.)

Three problems would have to be considered by Israeli strategic planners when contemplating this change in the mix of forces. First, if demilitarization were imposed, Egypt would be the more likely to have some motivation for violating it. The questions confronting Israel would be not only how to defend Israel against an advancing Egyptian force, but also how to deter Egypt from a violation in the first place. After all, Egypt might decide to remilitarize only parts of the Sinai, without even attacking the Israeli defence line. Israel would not be able to contain such a violation through a stationary defence system which relied on PGM along her border (presumably the pre-1967 border or close to it), but would depend on a credible threat to destroy the Egyptian forces while they were deployed in the desert. For that, however, Israeli defence strategy would have to continue to emphasize mobile offensive systems such as tanks. Second, Israel's disadvantage in terms of manpower could best be overcome by the deployment of those weapons in particular which are 'fire-intensive', and this consideration might affect decisions about optimal mixes of PGM and other weapons systems. Third, Israel would have to take into account the existence of several possible opponents besides Egypt–Syria, Jordan and even Iraq. The effect of the demilitarization of the Golan Heights and the West Bank (and, for that matter, parts of southern Lebanon up to the Litani river) and the creation of areas of limited deployment behind them would be more limited than in the case of the Sinai. For one thing, because of the narrow width of these two areas, a surprise attack is more probable. For another, the launching of a static campaign by the Arab states is a possibility. The Israeli response to such a campaign would probably be to transform the nature of the battle by going over to a mobile counter-attack. Because of the limited area for manoeuvre in such a campaign, the need for a large concentration of offensive systems (tanks) in order to break through the enemy's line would be crucial. Furthermore, extensive proliferation of Arab surface-to-air systems might limit Israeli air superiority and, in some circumstances, her deterrence capability – a capability which would become a major stabilizing factor if a political settlement were achieved. Israel might be forced to search for weapons systems which could suppress these air defence systems; these could include long-range PGM (as well as some 'area' weapons, electronic countermeasures, anti-radiation missiles and air-to-surface missiles). This would work to Israel's advantage only if the Arab states did not acquire similar systems, otherwise motivation for a first strike would increase.

Egypt, for her part, would probably face less acute problems if she added tactical PGM to the mix of her forces, since they would fit quite well with her traditional strategy of promoting her infantry, which is equipped with a wide range of anti-tank weapons and backed by armour and big concentrations of artillery. Although there are indications that Egypt is searching for new strategic options, she continues to stress the importance of her infantry and the vulnerability of the tank.

In view of the complexity of the problem, the success of a tacit agreement on a change in the mix of forces of all the regional powers is not very likely. It would perhaps succeed only with respect to limitations on the introduction of long-range PGM, because of a common anxiety about first strikes. Such a change should be discussed, however, as one of the possible avenues towards arms control.

Symmetrical quantitative limitations on transfers of arms should also be a subject for negotiations between recipients and suppliers, among whom the United States is likely to play the central role. Although, again, the chances for success are very limited, the attempt should be made. As suggested above, it is possible that the volume of arms transfers would decline as a consequence of unilateral decisions by the regional adversaries, prompted by a political settlement and the gradual defusing of the conflict. It would be worthwhile, however, to begin negotiations about such limitations even before a final political settlement. Qualitative limitations on arms supplies should have priority, both because it is more likely that effective formal agreements could be reached and because they are at present more critical. Quantitative restrictions imposed from the outside would become more critical only if there were a danger of imbalance in the arms race. A two-tier approach to these negotiations could be useful: first, three sets of simultaneous discussions between the United States and Israel, the United States and Egypt, and the United States, Britain and France. Second, a general conference of all the major suppliers including the Soviet Union and recipients in the Middle East.

IV. WHAT ROLE FOR THE SUPER-POWERS?

The super-powers could play a central role in future arms-control agreements in the Arab–Israeli region. The United States, which has always been committed to stability in the Middle East, will probably lead the way towards a political settlement coupled with arms-control measures. To what extent is it likely that the Soviet Union will become part of this process? Furthermore, to what extent is Soviet involvement desirable?

The answer to the first question depends on the political position that the Soviet Union adopts in the Arab world. If she maintains a close relationship with Syria, it is unlikely that she could be excluded completely from the bargaining process leading to a political settlement. Soviet participation may also be affected by the form of the negotiations. If a Geneva conference were convened and, more important, if meaningful negotiations were undertaken within the framework of this conference, there is a strong likelihood that the Soviet Union would play an important role in the negotiations. On the other hand, if the negotiations were conducted between Israel and the respective Arab states in separate, bilateral forums (under the umbrella of Geneva or some variant of the 'step-by-step' policy), and if, concomitantly, the ability of the Soviet Union to exert pressure on Syria were further eroded, it is probable that the United States alone would act as intermediary. Naturally this would also affect the respective involvement of the two super-powers in the ultimate arms-control arrangements.

As for the desirability of Soviet participation, future arms-control agreements could be divided into two parts: first, the broader issues of demilitarization of buffer zones, restrictions on deployment of forces, and measures against surprise attacks and counter-city strikes; and, second, restrictions on transfers of arms to the regional powers. It seems likely that the former could be agreed upon with considerable credibility, even if the United States acts alone as guarantor – provided, of course, that all the regional powers agreed to exclude the Soviet Union. To secure agreements relating to the transfer of arms to the regional powers, on the other hand, the participation of the Soviet Union would be essential. After all, the Soviet Union is still a major arms supplier to the region and, on the evidence of past experience, would probably be ready to transfer arms to certain Arab states in order to maintain or renew influence. Unless the Soviet Union became party to a system of controls on the flow of arms – in return for which she would surely demand some political consideration – these controls would not hold. Even those regional countries which agree at present to exclude the Soviet Union from negotiations might find it difficult to resist the temptation of receiving arms from her in the future, if the opportunity presented itself.*

It would be easier for a regional state to succumb to that temptation than to violate one of the arms-control measures in a set of broader agreements (if the Soviet Union were excluded from both), because there are two differences between these sets of arms-control measures. An agreement on restrictions on the flow of arms would probably be primarily a suppliers' agreement, even if it were achieved as a result of negotiations among suppliers and recipients. The regional recipients of arms, therefore, might feel free to purchase arms from a supplier who is not party to the agreement. Agreements about the broader arms-control measures, on the other hand, would be signed by the regional states with, it is hoped, a guarantee by external powers, and the signatories would be formally bound by them. The second difference is that sanctions to be imposed on violators of these latter agreements would probably be codified in the agreements and may be of both a political and a military nature. The sanctions should include movement of military units, remilitarization of zones and even initiation of armed hostilities. It is not clear how similar sanctions could be codified and subsequently imposed on a regional state which violated a suppliers' agreement on restrictions on transfers of arms by receiving prohibited arms from a supplier not bound by the agreement. The problem is not only to codify the sanctions and make them explicit – which is important in this case – but also to define the nature of the violation. In the case of the broader arms-control agreements, any violation will seem a threat to peace, even if it appears to be minor: remilitarization of small, erstwhile demilitarized areas might indicate the beginning of a 'salami-tactic' operation, and would therefore be met by a deterring reaction which would be different in kind from, and disproportionate to, the offence. On the other hand, the transfer of arms by a country which is not party to a suppliers' agreement could not, in most cases, be construed as a major threat: reactions to it would be unpredictable and the political cost to the recipient might be low. The natural reaction would be an equivalent transfer of arms to the other party. But this, of course, would shatter the whole system of restrictions and escalate the race to acquire precisely those systems which have already been shown to be destabilizing.

In conclusion, if some regional state – and the obvious present candidate is Syria – insisted on Soviet participation in the negotiations and hence in the pattern of inter-state relations which would emerge with a settlement, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union could be excluded from both sets of arms-control measures. If, on the other hand, there is no such insistence by any of the regional parties, then from the point of view of arms control the Soviet Union would have to be included in a suppliers' agreement, but could be excluded from other arms-control arrangements.[92] The political price that the Soviet Union would surely demand for participation in a suppliers' agreement can at present only be conjectured. Her demands would probably focus on legitimizing her position in the Middle East by formal American acceptance of it. This could be done, among other ways, by co-operating with the United States as the joint and equal guarantor of all political and arms-control agreements between Israel and the Arab states. Taking into consideration the current ebb in the Soviet position in the Middle East, it would indeed be a considerable concession by the United States to accept such an arrangement. Furthermore, Israel, and probably Egypt, would prefer not to see Soviet influence return in force to the Middle East. It is conceivable, however, that the Soviet Union might be excluded from Israeli–Egyptian and Israeli–Jordanian (and Palestinian) agreements, but included in those between Israel and Syria.

* John Barton has argued in a private communication that arms suppliers' agreements might gain local support and be enforceable without Soviet participation, particularly in view of the state of the economies of the main participants in the arms race. Although this may happen as well, the Soviet Union – to judge from past experience – is ready to deliver arms for political purposes without insisting on payment.

Guaranteeing Demilitarization

The 1976 interim agreement between Israel and Egypt set an important precedent in establishing greater American involvement in arms-control measures in the Middle East. Under the agreement, three surveillance stations manned by American personnel were created, the function of which is to monitor the immediate environment of the buffer zone and the Israeli and Egyptian intelligence stations. Both Israel and Egypt desired this American presence, which has introduced a new dimension into the situation in the Middle East.[93] It is not only that the Americans in the Sinai can verify compliance with the agreement, but they could also proffer arbitration in the event of violations and mutual accusation, thus preventing the possible escalation of local confrontations. In the case of surprise attacks, their very presence makes them, to an extent, hostages as well as observers. If they are injured, the likelihood of a strong American political reaction increases, and this may act as a limited deterrent. On the other hand, an American military reaction is unlikely, because the number of personnel is so limited and, furthermore, because it is not covered by a formal commitment. Thus the American personnel do not function as a 'tripwire' element.*

In future agreements about the demilitarization of the Sinai the American role could be much more significant. An American guarantee, written into an agreement, to enforce compliance with demilitarization would have a major deterrent effect. As distinct from all other American alliances after World War II, which have been aimed at defending states against Communist encroachment, the purpose of this proposed American guarantee would be to deter two regional states – Israel, a close friend of the United States (and, as proposed below, a formal ally as well), and Egypt, a state which is becoming increasingly friendly to the United States – from violating a regional agreement. This distinction would probably encourage a positive domestic American response and dispel doubts – a product of the post-Vietnam syndrome – about the credibility of this deterrent posture. The danger that Soviet involvement on the side of Egypt would deter the United States from fulfilling her obligations if Egypt were to decide to violate the demilitarization, and thus potentially weaken American resolve, now appears very unlikely. Even in the past, when the Soviet Union was Egypt's benefactor and the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation operated (signed by both countries in 1972 and dissolved in 1976 by President Sadat), the Soviet Union limited her commitment to military involvement to extreme situations in which the very existence of Egypt's regime (and her army) was threatened; she did not undertake to defend Egyptian forces if they attempted to conquer Sinai. The 'red lines' were clear: the Soviet Union would come to the aid of Egypt only if a major catastrophe was imminent: if Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal (as in 1973), or if the Israeli air force aimed at the destruction of the regime through deep-penetration bombing (as in 1970). With the present strained relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt, Soviet intervention even in these circumstances is doubtful, let alone if Egyptian forces were in the Sinai in violation of an explicit agreement. Once the United States became the guarantor of an Israeli–Egyptian agreement, the likelihood of Soviet interference on behalf of Egypt would further diminish. Even if good relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union were to be resumed, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would become involved in an Egyptian violation of an agreement which the United States was formally committed to guarantee.

An American guarantee, once extended and implemented over time, would signal that vital American interests were involved in the main-

* There is also an understanding that the personnel will be withdrawn in case of hostilities.

tenance of demilitarization. The balance of interest and commitment would favour the United States generally, which would be essential in a crisis in which each super-power was weighing the dangers of escalation, because the power with interests to protect would be the more likely to consider further military involvement, and deterrence would consequently be enhanced. But American underwriting of demilitarization would have further importance. If one side clearly violated the demilitarized zone, the other – with the acquiescence of the United States – might decide to resort immediately to force. American backing of this side would also be significant to the political outcome of the campaign.

Such a guarantee, of course, involves several potential costs for the United States and for the regional powers. The United States would have to take into account the possibility – remote as it may seem – of involvement in a political (if not a military) conflict with one or other of the regional parties in the event of violations. Second, the United States would have to consider the possibility of a confrontation with the Soviet Union if the latter – contrary to the dictates of rational analysis – decided to back an Egyptian violation of the agreement. Third, if the United States did not honour her own obligation to the agreement, she would lose credibility with her other allies. There would also be a dilemma for the regional parties. The guarantee would mean the sacrifice of some freedom of choice; violations or responses to them – for instance as part of a political bargaining process – would be severely constrained, and the United States would become the arbiter of many political and strategic issues between the two regional parties.

A joint American–Soviet guarantee would reduce some of these potential political costs to the United States. The two guarantors acting jointly could deter a violator from abrogating the agreement or compel withdrawal. Against the pressure of both super-powers, the regional power would have no chance of success. There would also be less likelihood of confrontation between the super-powers. The difficulties, however, are palpable. The two guarantors might have completely different interpretations of what was happening or about to take place, and this might paralyse them. If one decided, nevertheless, to deter or support a violation a super-power crisis could ensue. Thus, not only would the guarantee not operate but the potential for international crisis between the super-powers would increase as well. Secondly, the effectiveness of the joint guarantee would depend to a large extent on the global political relations between the super-powers. Only in a situation of enhanced detente (which is unlikely to obtain for quite some time, if at all) would there be a real chance that the United States and the Soviet Union could maintain a system of political co-operation in the Middle East. Although it is reasonable to assume that they would try to deter major escalation in the area even if their global relationship became strained (because of the tremendous risks involved in war in the Middle East), the joint guarantee would probably come under heavy strain. On balance, therefore, it appears that an exclusive American guarantee of the demilitarization of the Sinai as an arms-control measure would probably be more effective than one which involved the Soviet Union.

An additional way in which the United States could guarantee the demilitarization of Sinai is through direct physical involvement, either through participation in the verification of the agreement by means of intelligence-gathering and surveillance systems or through deployment of forces in the Sinai itself. A system of verification controlled jointly by the United States, Israel and Egypt would be an important instrument in the monitoring of possible violations. The system could comprise separate consoles in each country, on which any violations would be recorded simultaneously. A permanent commission composed of representatives of all three parties could meet regularly, and in times of emergency, to discuss and resolve the problems raised by violations, real or suspected.[94] The same commission could also discuss violations of agreements on deployment of forces and other moves which might indicate preparations for surprise attacks (see below). Thus a permanent crisis-management mechanism would be established, which could handle possible escalations and allow an exchange of views, thereby creating an opportunity for 'diplomatic pauses', all of which would help to defuse potential crises.

The deployment of American forces in the Sinai would serve as an important additional deterrent to violations of demilitarization. It is unlikely that their military strength would be sufficient to change, in any meaningful way, the outcome of a battle once it was joined. However, these troops could be made to serve as a 'trip-wire', and thus increase considerably the likelihood of American intervention against the side which violated the agreement.

What about the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? The political structure that would emerge in the Middle East after a settlement is important in this context. If these areas were returned to Jordon, or to some form of Jordanian–Palestinian federation, effective demilitarization would be possible, and the two regional parties to a demilitarization agreement would probably retain their orientation towards the United States. However, it is difficult to envisage the demilitarization of a completely independent Palestinian state, if one emerged, because no sovereign state is prepared to exist without the protection of armed forces. An independent Palestinian state might look to the Soviet Union and under some conditions develop destabilizing tendencies. Because of this, a 'Jordanian solution' is preferable to a 'Palestinian solution'. Only one advantage could be gained from the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, provided it undertook to sign and maintain a full peace treaty with Israel. It would resolve, at least partially, the ideological conflict and would make it very difficult for any other Arab state to maintain a 'rejectionist' position. One possible solution would be to create a Jordan–Palestine federation. However, from the point of view of arms control and stability it would be important, in such a case, to ensure that the real military power still rested with Jordan and that effective demilitarization would be imposed.

American guarantees for a demilitarized West Bank would act as a deterrent against possible violations. But, in contrast to the situation in the Sinai, the deployment of American forces as an additional deterrent would probably be counter-productive. To begin with, conflict between Israel and Jordan (or a Jordanian–Palestinian federation) is less likely than one between Israel and Egypt. Jordan is much weaker than Egypt and is less likely to become involved in a clash. Once a political settlement had been achieved, Israel would have no motive for an attack on the West Bank. An American guarantee would be required primarily to provide Jordan (or a federation) with a justification for refraining from engagement with Israel, should other Arab states demand military support in a crisis. Similarly, the guarantee would inhibit possible Israeli military operations against Jordan in a conflict involving another Arab state. To fulfil these objectives there would be no need for actual deployment of American forces. Besides, such a deployment in the densely populated West Bank and Gaza Strip areas might only arouse animosity, since the American forces might be considered an 'occupation force'.

One of the threats to stability after a settlement might be a renewal of infiltration from across the border of the new political entity. Extreme groups on the West Bank might hope to shatter the settlement (which they might consider a sell-out) by provoking Israel to retaliate on a grand scale against the new regime. This would probably lead to a major crisis from which the extremists could extract political gain. Should an American guarantee refer to this problem as well? It appears that the best procedure would be to deal with this threat through security arrangements approved by the regional parties to the agreement (e.g. a joint policing policy), rather than through American guarantees. There is no way in which the guarantor could effectively handle small-scale, non-government-sponsored actions, it would be better not to burden the guarantee with impossible tasks.

The demilitarization of the Golan Heights would pose a different set of problems. First, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union could be kept out of an agreement concerning this area. Indeed, there are clear advantages to her involvement in the system of guarantees applied there, since the Soviet Union still maintains an important link with Syria, and it is not likely that Syria would be ready to sever this link. Moreover, as has already been noted, participation would probably be the minimum political *quid pro quo* that the Soviet Union would demand in exchange for accession to suppliers' agreements on restrictions on the transfers of arms. Indeed, the Soviet Union would probably demand full and equal participation in the whole system of guarantees; whether she succeeded would depend on the reactions of the local parties and of the

United States. But it would be advisable to meet the Soviet Union half-way by involving her in the Syrian–Israeli agreement. The second problem is that the area for potential demilitarization is small, and hence its utility as a credible buffer zone is limited. Either side (particularly Syria) could storm it in a brisk operation. Deployment of joint American–Soviet forces there as a 'tripwire' would thus be the main, and not an ancillary, deterrent.

Guaranteeing a 'No First Use of Force' Treaty

It is doubtful whether a guarantee by the super-powers of the integrity of a NFUFT would enhance stability in the Middle East. The treaty would probably be general and would have, as noted on p. 22, both a symbolic and a specific effect inside the Arab world by increasing the uncertainty of each Arab state about the others' readiness to resort to war. To be sure, the super-powers' guarantees could help to allay this anxiety and would confirm the commitment of the super-powers to peace in the region. On the other hand, however, such a guarantee might create graver dilemmas for the super-powers than would guarantees concerning demiltarized zones. To begin with, there is the famous – and extensively debated – problem of how to define the first use of force and whether the force has been used, justifiably, 'in self-defence' or 'aggressively'. Under other agreements, identification of the violator would be relatively easy because it would be based on clear physical and technical evidence: the violator would be the side which has remilitarized parts of buffer zones, has increased forces in areas where this is restricted, or has interfered with legitimate intelligence-gathering procedures, etc. Second, the first use of force might be prompted by a violation of another arms-control agreement (such as demilitarization of zones). Could this act be construed as 'self-defence', or as a justified reprisal for the first violation? As suggested before, such a resort to force should not be seen as violation of the NFUFT. But the two super-powers might put different interpretations on such a reprisal, and this could paralyse their reactions, leading to a loss of their credibility or, worse, to a direct confrontation between them. Things might become even more complex if the United States were to be joint guarantor with the Soviet Union of the NFUFT and sole guarantor of other arms-control agreements. In that case, the Soviet Union would probably argue the centrality of the NFUFT and its precedence over those arms-control agreements of which the United States was sole guarantor. This last contingency could be avoided if the two super-powers were the joint guarantors, or the United States the sole guarantor, of *all* arms-control agreements in the Arab–Israeli region. The first solution, although it would have some advantages, could generate major political difficulties and could also, as suggested above (p. 30), be counter-productive in arms-control terms as well. The second solution would be more satisfactory, but is unlikely to obtain.

The main point, however, is that if there were a conflict between a general agreement (such as a NFUFT) and a more specific one (such as agreements on demilitarization of zones and restrictions on deployment of forces), the latter should prevail, the guarantees by the super-powers of the former should not interfere with the execution and maintenance of the latter, and precisely because such guarantees might lead to conflict, it would be better, on balance, not to solicit them.

Guaranteeing a 'No Counter-city Attacks' Treaty

A NCAT would be aimed at modifying the strategic behaviour of the regional parties. This being the case, it is difficult to see the possible advantages to be gained by the involvement of the super-powers. There is, of course, one important link between such an agreement and the super-powers' interests: it could supply part of the conceptual framework for a suppliers' agreement on restrictions on transfers of systems whose main mission is counter-city strikes. This would not, however, justify the super-powers guaranteeing a NCAT. In any case, it is not at all clear how such a guarantee would operate or what strategic interests would compel the super-powers to intervene with force if a NCAT were violated.

An American–Israeli Defence Treaty

All the arms-control agreements suggested in this Paper would involve both regional parties, with one exception. This would be an Israeli–American Defence Treaty, to be signed once a complete political settlement had been reached.[95]

After such a settlement Israel's aims would again (as before 1967) be the prevention of war and the retention of the territorial *status quo*. Some Arab elites, or groups within these elites, would probably still reject Israel's status and the major problem would then be how to increase the constraints on an Arab decision to go to war. An American defence treaty with Israel would act as a major deterrent against such plans. The proposed treaty should be a mutual pact, with the terms including military co-ordination between the two countries and assurances about continued transfers of arms to Israel, subject to any restrictions agreed upon by the suppliers.

A defence treaty would create some problems for the United States and for Israel, but would, on balance, make a significant contribution to stability. To begin with, there is the possibility that such a treaty would complicate the American political position in the Arab world, although Arab leaders have often suggested American guarantees to Israel as a way out of the political impasse in the Middle East. Their idea is that in consideration for Israeli withdrawals they would extend a guarantee of non-belligerency, while the United States proffered guarantees to Israel. From their point of view this solution would presumably extricate them from the dilemma of agreeing to full 'normalization' of political relations with Israel. The major dilemma for the United States concerns the question of whether deterrence would be successful and what would happen if it failed. It is highly probable that deterrence would, indeed, be very effective. Once a settlement were reached, Arab motivation to attack would diminish considerably. Furthermore, the Israeli deterrence posture is very credible, and, with their lower level of motivation, the costs of an attack would appear to Arab leaders even more unpalatable than they have since 1967. Last, but not least, the threat of American political sanctions, and in the last resort of military intervention, would be a powerful deterrent. If deterrence should nevertheless fail, the present military situation in the Middle East suggests that Israel could be in a position to defend herself successfully without America support. An American undertaking to send forces to help Israel would really refer to a last resort, which is unlikely to obtain in the foreseeable future but would have, nevertheless, to be averted.

An American guarantee would have two additional effects, both stabilizing: first, it would alleviate Israel's concern about her long-range security, and hence reduce the possibility of Israel's exercising the nuclear option or launching a pre-emptive or anticipatory strike; second, it would confirm American commitment to maintaining the balance of military power between Israel and the Arab states, which might be threatened in the long run by the continued accumulation of financial resources at the hands of the Arab countries.

The terms of the defence treaty would probably, however, impose some limitations on Israel's freedom of manoeuvre in certain strategic affairs. It seems unlikely that the United States would be prepared to be party to any such agreement without a measure of control over Israel's conduct in crises, and strategic moves that Israel might feel were necessary to her security would probably become subjects for bilateral negotiation before any action could be taken by her. This would certainly pose some problems for Israel but would be more than compensated for by the additional security gained through the treaty. From the American point of view, however, the formulation of constraints on Israel's conduct could raise difficulties. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization such constraints operate through political co-ordination in the alliance and are a by-product of a unified military command system, which is dictated by the large number of participants in the Alliance and the perennial problem of decisions on the use of nuclear weapons if deterrence fails (and to enhance deterrence). In NATO the role of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), is always filled by an American. It is unlikely that a similar command system could or should develop under the proposed treaty, but control could be exercised through permanent political-military commissions. Moreover the treaty would only be one part of a comprehensive system of security and arms-control measures in the Middle East, in which Israel would probably have a strong interest. Lack of co-ordination with the United States in decisions about crisis management might bring about the collapse of both the treaty and the security system. It is unlikely that Israel would be prepared to pay this high political and strategic price.

Would the treaty impose political constraints on Israel aside from those concerning crisis behaviour? This is highly unlikely. The confidence that Israel would gain from the treaty would strengthen her hand in political negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Arab states. Moreover, since the treaty is not directed against the Soviet Union (though it would be invoked if there were the threat of a Soviet attack on Israel) but would serve a regional function, there would be no undue Soviet apprehension about it. The treaty would probably arouse radical feelings in the Arab world, but Arab radicals in any case consider Israel a 'stooge of American imperialism', and the treaty would not therefore provoke any new suspicions. Furthermore, several leading Arab countries have become (or have always been) American-oriented. In conclusion, therefore, the treaty could serve to increase Israel's freedom of political manoeuvre.

V. CONCLUSION

The Relationship between Politics and Arms Control

Is it possible to achieve arms control in the Middle East in the present political context, or must political change precede arms control? A similar debate within the context of Soviet–American relations has persisted since the early 1960s, and three schools of thought have emerged which should be considered, since they will probably influence debates on arms-control efforts in the Middle East as well. The first school argues that arms control can be decoupled from politics; that arms-control agreements and measures are possible even in situations of severe conflict, without concomitant political relaxation; that arms-control measures and agreements can be achieved in such circumstances because they serve some limited shared interests of the adversaries. The second approach argues that there are links between arms-control agreements and changes in the political relationship between adversaries, but that agreements can be reached first and may even pave the way for political change by creating a new international climate. The third group accepts the existence of links between the realm of arms control and the realm of politics, but argues that political relaxation must precede arms-control agreements.

The historical experience in the Middle East indicates that tacit arms-control measures can be achieved in a situation of severe political conflict. Moreover, because of the role played by external powers, such measures, independent of political relaxation, are perhaps more possible than in the super-power relationship. At the same time those past successes have not contributed to political relaxation, but only to the postponement of wars or limitations on the use of force. Direct, significant, formal agreements between the regional powers did not take place between the signing of the Armistice agreements in 1949 until after the 1973 war.

But what of the future? In theory it seems possible that the same *type* of arms-control measures could be applied again, even without prior formal political agreements. These measures are primarily the tacit full or partial demilitarization of the Sinai (if, for example, Israeli forces withdrew unilaterally from this area without reaching any agreement with Egypt beforehand), and agreements among the suppliers about limitations on the supply of arms. Because Israeli occupation of the territories since 1967 has become the central issue of political aggravation, any Israeli withdrawal from these territories would bring about a considerable political relaxation, since it would diminish Arab motivation for another war and therefore stabilize relations in the region. The stabilizing effect of this proposed 'package' of steps would probably be more considerable than in the past, precisely because of the centrality of the territorial issue and because the wars and violence of the period since 1967 have proved the political unprofitability of war. However, such steps which combine political moves (the Israeli withdrawals) with arms-control measures (tacit demilitarization) would not be able to stave off future crises to the same extent as formal and more elaborate measures.

The linkage between arms control and politics in the Arab–Israeli region has three facets: first, to be stable and enduring, a political settlement would need concomitant arms-control measures; second, a political settlement would depend, to a large extent, on gradual steps, which would themselves require the support of a considerable number of arms-control agreements and measures; third, settlement would demand some political concessions on both sides.

Both the 'step-by-step' and the 'final-settlement' approach (the latter to be implemented by stages) would entail such agreements. Without them mutual suspicions might lead to new explosions, even if political developments were propitious, and in that sense it seems that arms control should precede political negotiation. Indeed, a consideration of the three interim agreements reached between the combatants (the first Israeli–Egyptian agreement of January 1974, the Israeli–Syrian agreement of June 1974, and the Israeli–Egyptian agreement of September 1975) proves that arms-control measures were cardinal. One of the reasons was that the Arab states preferred to focus on arms-control and security aspects in the agreements rather than on political contact with Israel. Another reason was the nature of military relations between the two sides following the 1973 war: anxiety concerning both general surprise attacks and limited attacks had gradually to be allayed. Since such concerns will persist, arms-control agreements will be central to political development.

Israel emphasizes both the political dimension of any future settlement (that is, the 'nature of peace'; for example, issues such as diplomatic relations, economic co-operation, open borders, etc. – all subsumed in the notion of 'normalization') and the security requirements. It does not seem realistic, however, to expect that everyone could be fully secured. Indeed, trade-offs could be envisaged between the political concessions which Israel might demand in return for the occupied territories and the various security measures, primarily arms-control agreements, which the Arab states might appear more willing to undertake. The nature of the settlement might be less formal Arab political concessions and more arms-control measures. Indeed, if Israel were faced with a choice between these trade-offs, she would be advised to opt for the latter, because ultimately they are more stabilizing.* This would allow for gradual change in Arab ideological opposition to Israel – which would probably endure for quite some time – and also for the development of direct contacts between Israel and the Arab states, even without formal acknowledgement of that process. Ultimately this might also bring about further formal political change.

The arms-control measures suggested in this study are important not only because extreme anti-Israeli sentiment will probably persist and must be countered but also because the potential for future political conflict, followed by crisis and war, is high in an area where there are many states with active foreign policies, where power blocs keep changing and shifting and where domestic instability is likely to continue. Indeed, even if the ideological component were to disappear and full peace, endorsed by diplomatic and economic relations, were to be established, other forces might provoke conflict between Israel and one or more Arab states. An arms-control regime could make the eruption of war resulting from such conflict less likely.

The political component, on the other hand, is important not only to the defusion of the conflict, but also in furnishing a broad context for the various steps towards arms control. Herein lies the third link between arms control and the political process. The Israeli occupation of Arab territories since 1967 has so aggravated the conflict that it would be impossible to formulate far-reaching, formal arms-control agreements without linking them with gradual Israeli withdrawals from all the territories conquered in 1967 (possibly with some minor modifications agreed upon between the sides). Similarly, the Arab countries would have to make some important political concessions. Negotiations concerning a final political settlement would, therefore, have to include formal arms-control agreements, to be ratified only if both sides

* President Carter's endorsement of 'normalization' and President Sadat's cautious positive reaction to it during his visit to Washington in spring 1977 may indicate a change in the prospects for achieving 'normalization'. Even then, the problem of trade-offs will remain.

indicated their readiness eventually to make political concessions.

How to Reach the Agreements and Their Priorities

Some of the arms-control agreements discussed here could be reached in stages associated with partial political arrangements. The obvious candidates for such an approach are agreements about the demilitarization of zones, restrictions on deployment of forces and various methods of verification. Partial agreements on demilitarization of any area from which Israeli forces withdrew could be coupled with intensified restrictions on deployments of forces or weapons systems beyond these areas. Simultaneously, the role of the United States in the verification system could be increased qualitatively and quantitatively. At the same time, the United States, Israel and Egypt could begin discussions on a wide range of arms-control measures. Syria and Jordan could join these or parallel sets of discussions, which could be handled either under the umbrella of Geneva or in other *ad hoc* forums. One possible forum is the Joint Commission created under the Israeli–Egyptian interim agreement of 1975. Another is the Military Working Group which operated in Geneva. The best approach, however, would be to establish a separate, high-powered forum whose sole responsibility would be planning future arms control. These discussions might serve two purposes simultaneously: they could 'educate' the parties in the concepts of arms control and thus prepare the ground inside the defence establishment of both sides for eventual negotiations on arms-control measures, and they could work out the actual details of new arms-control agreements.

While these meetings were taking place, the United States could be seeking to reach understandings with Britain and France about possible restrictions on transfers of arms to Middle Eastern countries. As things stand at present, it is not very likely that contacts among, or a conference between, these three suppliers would be successful in the near future; nevertheless, they could increase the awareness of all parties of the dangers inherent in the continued arms race and might have some limited results. A treaty banning counter-city attacks could also be signed before a final settlement had been agreed upon. Such a treaty could only be the result of full discussions between the regional parties but the process could begin with a limited agreement between Israel and one Arab country. Partial agreements could also include clauses about the non-use of force (similar to that in the 1975 Israeli–Egyptian interim agreement).

There are, however, several major arms-control agreements which will have to form part of, or be predicated on, a final settlement. These are the final demilitarization of all the occupied territories; a treaty banning first use of force; the involvement of the super-powers as guarantors; the convening of a conference of all arms suppliers (including the Soviet Union); and the creation of a permanent mechanism for the restriction of transfers of arms; a comprehensive treaty prohibiting counter-city attacks; and the signing of an Israeli–American defence treaty. It is doubtful whether all these agreements could be concluded. It may be that in the process of bargaining some of them would have to be abandoned, and the question of their order of priority would then be raised. It is clear that agreements about demilitarization of zones and restrictions on deployment of forces beyond these zones, coupled with appropriate verification procedures, would be the most important; second, a defence treaty between the United States and Israel; third, guarantees by the super-powers (or the United States alone, as the case might be) concerning the demilitarized zone and the deployment of their forces there; fourth, restrictions on transfers of arms; fifth, treaties prohibiting the first use of force and counter-city attacks.

NOTES

[1] For the concept of the 'heart' of the Middle East (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq), see Nadav Safran, *From War to War: The Arab–Israeli Confrontation 1948–1967* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 92.

[2] The following is a selection of works on arms races and arms control in the Middle East: Alan Dowty, 'Israeli Perspectives on Nuclear Proliferation', in Johan J. Holst (ed.), *Security, Order and the Bomb* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972), and his 'Israel's Nuclear Policy' (forthcoming); Yair Evron, 'Israel and the Atom: The Uses and Misuses of Ambiguity, 1957–1967', *Orbis*, Winter 1974, *The Demilitarization of Sinai*, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems No. 11 (Jerusalem: Davis Institute for International Relations, 1975), and 'Arms Races in the Middle East and some Arms-Control Measures Related to Them' in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), *Dynamics of a Conflict* (New York: Humanities Press, 1975); Fuad Jabber, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present Options and Future Strategies* (London: Chatto & Windus for the IISS, 1971), and 'Not by War Alone: Curbing the Arab–Israeli Arms Race', *Middle East Journal*, Summer 1974; John C. Lambalet, 'A Dynamic Model of the Arms Race in the Middle East, 1953–1965', *General Systems Yearbook* Vol. XVI (1971); Jeffrey S. Milstein, 'American and Soviet Influence: Balance of Power and Arab–Israeli Violence', in B. M. Russett (ed.), *Peace, War and Numbers* (Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972), and 'Soviet and American Influences on the Arab–Israeli Arms Race: A Quantitative Analysis', in Walter Isard and Julian Wolpart (eds), *Papers*, Vol. XV (Philadelphia: Peace Research Society, 1970); Nazli Choucri, 'Defence Budgets and the Middle East Conflict: A Commentary', in Isard, *op. cit.*; Colin Gray, 'Arms Races and their Influences upon International Stability, with special reference to the Middle East', in Sheffer, *op. cit.*; Geoffrey Kemp, *Arms and Security, the Egypt–Israel Case*, Adelphi Paper No. 52 (London: IISS, 1968); Michael Mihalka, 'Understanding Arms Accumulation, The Middle East as an Example', in Joseph Ben-Dak (ed.), *International Conflicts and the Methodology of their Assessments* (New York, 1973), George Quester, 'Israel and the Non-Proliferation Treaty', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1969; Hans Rattinger, 'From War to War to War: Arms Races in the Middle East', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 1976); Dina A. Zinnes, John V. Gillespie and Phillip A. Schrodt, 'The Arab–Israeli Arms Race: An Empirical Explanation', *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Fall 1976); Steven J. Rosen, 'Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East', in Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz (eds), *Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975); Safran, *op. cit.* in note 1; Dale R. Tahtinen, *The Arab–Israeli Military Balance Since October 1973* (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974).

[3] On the complex patterns of competition among the other Arab states there are many works. For one widely quoted work, see Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and his Rivals, 1958–1970* (London: Oxford UP, 1971). On the shifts of coalitions in the Arab world see Yair Evron and Yaacov Bar Simantov, 'Coalitions in the Arab World', *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter 1975). On the complex relationship between inter-Arab relations and the Arab–Israeli conflict, see, for example, Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'Inter-Arab Relations and the Arab–Israeli Conflict', *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Summer 1976).

[4] On Iran's foreign policy see, *inter alia*, Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

[5] On the whole problem of arms deliveries to Iran see *US Military Sales to Iran*, Staff report to Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1976. See also Shahram Chubin, *Implications of the Military Build-up in Non-industrial States: The Case of Iran* (mimeo), prepared for the Conference on Implications of the Military Build-up in Non-industrial States, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass., May 1976.

[6] For example, Saudi Arabia ordered 38 *Mirage* V from France by late 1973 for delivery to Egypt (see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1975*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1975, p. 229). These planes might, in fact, have been *Mirage* IIIAES (see *The Military Balance 1975–1976*, London, IISS, 1975, p. 37); *Washington Post*, 5 June 1973; *Congressional Record*, 2 March 1976 (insertion by Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal of article by John K. Cooley in the *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 December 1976); *New York Times*, 21 July 1975.

[7] For an initial discussion of some principles for arms control in the Persian Gulf, see Edward M. Kennedy, 'The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (October 1975).

[8] Schelling and Halperin defined arms control as 'all the forms of military co-operation between potential enemies in the interests of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it'. See Morton Halperin and Thomas Schelling, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York; Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 2. Needless to say, there are other definitions and also variations of the Schelling and Halperin definition. For an emphasis on defence expenditure reduction as a main objective of arms control, see Bernard Brodie, 'On the Objectives of Arms Control', *International Security*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976).

[9] Some of the early and widely quoted works on arms control are: Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age* (New York, Praeger, 1961); Halperin and Schelling, *op. cit.*; Donald Brennan, *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security* (New York, Braziller, 1961); for one of several recent attempts to generalize and theorize about arms control, see David V. Edwards, *Arms Control in International Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969); see also Stanford Arms Control Group, *International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

[10] On this see, *inter alia*, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *The International Transfer of Conventional Arms* (A Report to the Congress, 12 April 1974), pp. C-12, 13.

[11] For an account of the Israeli efforts to circumvent the embargo, see, *inter alia*, Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, *The Israeli Army* (London: Allen Lane, 1975), p. 47. A popularized account of the Israeli covert arms purchases can be found in Leonard Slater, *The Pledge* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).

[12] On the Tripartite Declaration, see Safran, *op. cit.*, in note 1; Fuad Jabber, *The Politics of Arms Transfer and Control: The United States and Egypt's Quest for Arms, 1950–1955* (South California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, 1972); John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1960); and Kemp, *op. cit.* in note 2.

[13] On American arms supplies policy towards the Middle East in the first half of the 1950s, see Jabber *op. cit.* in note 12, pp. 15–30; Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–72; and Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles: The Diplomacy of the Eisenhower Era* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 323–4.

[14] See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Arms Trade Registers* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), p. 46.

[15] Egypt attempted to secure American military assistance in early 1950, autumn 1950, autumn 1952, early 1953, and finally in March–July 1955. The early efforts were stymied by strong British pressure. Later on, in 1953, the United States became interested in the supply of arms to Egypt but linked it with the idea of a regional security organization. When this idea failed, the American military aid did not come through. See Jabber, *op. cit.* in note 12, pp. 19–23. For a version which argues that Egypt had, in fact, already reached an arms agreement with the Soviet Union in January 1955, see Uri Ra'anan, *The USSR Arms the Third World* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969). It is not clear whether Egyptian efforts to secure arms from the United States persisted until July 1955, since Egypt was interested in a major political move to undercut the Baghdad Pact initially formed in February 1955, and arms from the Soviet Union could serve this function.

[16] See *Middle East Record 1967*, p. 43.

[17] See Yair Evron, 'French Arms Policy in the Middle East', *The World Today*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (February 1970), pp. 82–98.

[18] References to the development of the *Chariot* tank were made in numerous publications. See, *inter alia*, *Maarachot* [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Israel Defence Forces Publications House, June 1977).

[19] See *New York Times*, 18 September 1954, p. 1.

[20] *Documents in Disarmament 1945–1959*, Vol. I (Washington DC: ACDA, 1960), p. 615.

[21] See *The International Transfer of Conventional Arms*, *op. cit.* in note 10, p. C-11, and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1957–1958*, p. 15370, which refers to a speech by Shepilov delivered before the Supreme Soviet on the same issue.

[22] *New York Times*, 28 April 1956, pp. 1, 3.

[23] *Documents on Disarmament*, Vol. II, 1957–9 (Washington DC: ACDA, 1960), p. 943.

[24] *Documents on Disarmament*, 1963 (Washington DC: ACDA), pp. 187–93.

[25] Heikal also argues that in the initial phase after the Arab defeat of 1967, Egypt and the Soviet Union were worried lest Israel should decide to attack again and bring about the collapse of the Egyptian regime. The road to Cairo was, in fact, open before the Israeli forces. The Soviet Union therefore decided, as an ally and friend, to help Egypt. See Mohamad Hassanein Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (London: Collins, 1975), pp. 44–6.

[26] See mainly Jon D. Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975). William Quandt, on the other hand, maintains that the Soviet Union never imposed such limitations; see his report 'Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War', (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica: May 1976, R-1864-ISA).

[27] For the latter interpretation, see Glassman, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 93–5.

[29] See *Janes' All the World's Aircraft 1976–76* (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1975), p. 501.

[30] See Alvin Z. Rubenstein, *Red Star on the Nile* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 237, pp. 251–3; Quandt, *op. cit.*; Glassman, *op. cit.*, pp. 112–17.

[31] Quandt, *op. cit.*, p. 5; Rubenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 139–40, 146–9.

[32] See *Department of State Bulletin*, LVII, 1463 (10 July 1967).

[33] *Middle East Record 1967* (Tel Aviv: Israel Universities Press, 1971), p. 40.

[34] On 23 March Secretary of State Rogers stated clearly that the withholding of the *Phantoms* was linked with American efforts to 'engage the other major suppliers . . . in early arms limitations talks'. See *The International Transfer of Conventional Arms*, *op. cit.* in note 10, p. C-3.

[35] Based on interviews in Washington.

[36] This approach was formulated primarily by Joseph Sisco. On this, see Edward R. F. Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger* (New York: Readers Digest Press, 1976), p. 21.

[37] See, for example, *New York Times*, 6 February 1972.

[38] Quandt, *op. cit.* in note 26, p. 37.

[39] See, for example, *Congressional Record* (Senate), 28 January 1974, 'Congress Files an Extraordinary Report: The Middle East War'.

[40] The actual wording was: '. . . The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the *Pershing* . . . with conventional warheads, with a view to giving a positive response'. *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, United States Senate, 6–7 October 1975, Appendix; *New York Times*, 17 September 1975.

[41] A recent instance of growing co-operation between the nuclear-weapons powers (and other states, which export nuclear technology) has been the London 'Suppliers' Club' meetings, which agreed on some safeguards concerning nuclear technology exports aimed at reaching a comprehensive system of such safeguards.

[42] On this see Nissim Bar Yaacov, *The Israel–Syrian Armistice* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967).

[43] On that experience see Yair Evron, *The Demilitarization of Sinai*, *op. cit.* in note 2.

[44] During the negotiations between Israel and the United States about the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai after the 1956 Sinai campaign, only the following two issues were raised: Israel's passage through the straits, and the future of the Gaza Strip. Israel demanded that the United Nations should have exclusive control over this strip. In this context see, in particular, Dulles's aide-memoire of 11 March 1957 given to Abba Eban, Eisenhower's reference to the matter on 25 February 1957,and Mrs Meir's speech in the United Nations General Assembly of 1 March 1957. See also Theodore Draper, *Israel and World Politics* (New York: Viking, 1967), pp. 19–21, 137–9. Yigal Allon also refers to the fact that Israel did not even demand the demilitarization of the Sinai in *Masach shel Hol* [Curtain of Sand] (Tel Aviv, 1960), pp. 355–6.

[45] Allon, *op. cit.*, pp. 343–5; *idem*, 'Hashlav Ha'aharon Bemilhemet Hashirur', [The Last Phase in the War of Independence], *Ot*, Nos. 3–4 (November 1967), p. 4; *idem*, 'Haganah Pe'ila Aruva Lekiumer [Active Defence as a Guarantee for our Existence], *Molad* (July–August 1967), p. 141; Shimon Peres, *Ma'arachot*, No. 146 (1962), p. 3. For an analysis of Israel's *casus belli*, see Dan Horowitz, *Hatfisah Hayisraelit shel Beitahon Leumi* [Israel's Concept of National Security] (Jerusalem: The Eshkol Institute, The Hebrew University, 1973), p. 25.

[46] For an Israeli's appraisal of this Egyptian strategy, see Allon, *op. cit.* in note 44, p. 341.

[47] At the peak of Egyptian military involvement in Yemen, some 70,000 Egyptian soldiers were stationed there.

[48] Estimates of the overall number of Egyptian forces so deployed are various. Estimates in Israel ranged between one division and two divisions, plus varying numbers of tanks (apparently about 250). Only two squadrons of fighters or fighter-bombers were kept permanently in Sinai, and none of them were MiG-21. See Levi Eshkol's speech in the Knesset, 22 May 1967; Shmuel Segev, *Sadin Adom* [Red Sheet] (Tel Aviv, 1967), p. 22; Michael Bar-Zohar, *Hahodesh Ha'aroch Beyoter* [The Longest Month] (Tel Aviv, 1969), p. 40; interview with Gen. (Res.) Gavish, *Yediot Ahronot*, 3 April 1970. The size of the Egyptian forces, as well as the manner and whereabouts of their deployment, were such that Israel felt secure in positioning only one battalion and no more than a few dozen tanks along the southern border.

[49] The Egyptian defensive positions on the eve of the 1967 war were based on strong defensive lines astride the three main routes through which the Israeli forces could break into Sinai. The Palestinian Division took its position in the Gaza Strip, while Division 7 held the northern route leading from Rafiah to al'-Arish; Division 2 was in the centre with Abu-Ageilah as its pivot, and Division 6 was placed on the southern approach. Other Egyptian units were positioned between and behind these divisions. Each defensive area was based on a strong combination of infantry, artillery and armour, arranged in three successive defensive lines. Although the actual deployment of aircraft was minimal, there were five airfields which were ready and could be activated at short notice: al'-Arish, Jebal Livni, Bir-Gifgafah, Bir-Tamdah and Nahal. Sixteen radar stations were spread throughout Sinai. The network of roads had also been considerably developed during the 1957–67 period.

[50] See *Middle East Record 1 1960* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, n. d.) pp. 202–4; Ezer Weizman in *Yediot Ahronot*, 4 June 1971; M. A. Gilboa, *Shesh Shanim Shisha Yamim* [Six Years, Six Days] (Tel Aviv, 1967), pp. 21–2.

[51] For the closure of the straits as a *casus belli*, see T. Draper, *Israel and World Politics: Roots of the Third Arab–Israeli War* (New York: Viking; London: Secker & Warburg, 1968), p. 21, quoting Mrs Meir's speech in the United Nations on 1 March 1957; see also David Ben-Gurion's interview in *Newsweek*, 25 March 1957, p. 46; and Allon and Peres, as cited above.

[52] However, in closed meetings with American decision-makers during the last phase of the 1967 crisis, Israeli diplomats increasingly referred to the concentration of Egyptian forces in the Sinai as a threat and a major cause for alarm.

[53] The most famous treatment of this subject is Lewis F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (London: Stevens, 1960). For a comprehensive review and critique of it, see Anatol Rapoport, 'Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Nos. 1, 2 (July 1975). The subject has been dealt with in several other works. For a more recent one, arguing a pattern of causal relationships between arms races and wars, see N. Z. Alcock, 'Arms Races and War', in *Scientists and World Affairs* (Proceedings of the 22nd Pugwash Conference, Oxford), pp. 251–8. For a preliminary discussion of this subject in the context of the Middle East see Yair Evron, 'Arms Races in the Middle East . . .', *op. cit.* in note 2.

[54] And see *The International Transfer of Conventional Arms*, *op. cit.* in note 10.

[55] For details about the arms race in the Middle East, see some of the works mentioned in note 2. Also International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, annual); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, *World Armaments and Disarmament* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell; Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, annual); SIPRI, *Arms Trade Registers: The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell; Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1975).

[56] And see Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford UP, 1974), chapter 6, and Yair Evron, 'Arms Races in the Middle East . . .', *op. cit.* in note 2.

[57] See Benjamin Geist, *The Six Day War* (Ph.D. Thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1974. Unpublished) and Brecher, *op. cit.* in note 56, chapter 7.

[58] On Soviet–Egyptian co-operation in rebuilding the Egyprian army see, *inter alia*, Mohamad Hassanein Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, *op. cit.* in note 25.

[59] That the question of the occupied territories was the major reason for the war is accepted by the majority of observers. The idea that even a limited Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai would have at least postponed the war was eventually accepted even by some members of the Israeli leadership. See Mati Golan, *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger* (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), pp. 144–6, where he describes a conversation between Mrs Meir and Dr Kissinger in which she admitted as much.

[60] See, *inter alia*, Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement* (Boston: Little, Brown; London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975).

[61] The increased 'reach' of Israeli military capabilities was dramatically demonstrated by the Israeli raid on Entebbe.
[62] For Peres' assessment, see *Haaretz*, 16 July 1976. For Rabin's assessment, see *Haaretz*. For the rise in armour, see comparison between issues of *The Military Balance* of 1973–4 and 1975–6; Israel's tank inventory rose by 50 per cent between 1973 and 1975 according to these accounts.
[63] See *The Military Balance 1975–1976*, pp. 34–5.
[64] There have been many references to it in the Israeli press. See, for example, the report on a press conference with Brigadier Dan Shomron, *Haaretz*, 22 September 1975.
[65] See the *New York Times*, 13 January 1977; *Aviation Week*, 17 January 1977.
[66] See *Aviation Week*, 14 July 1975, pp. 14–15.
[67] See *Aviation Week*, 17 November 1975, p. 22. Another report places the size of the proposed deal at 80 units; see *Time* magazine, 22 March 1976, p. 24.
[68] West Germany was reluctant to supply the type but encouraged Egypt to turn to France. An Egyptian evaluation team spent some time in Istres, France, in March 1976 flight-testing the plane. See *Aviation Week*, 17 May 1976, p. 11.
[69] Egypt is now believed to have 48 MiG-23 (*Flogger*). Half are of the type E export air-superiority version, the other half of the type F export ground-attack version. See *International Defense Review*, Vol. 9, No. 6, 1976.
[70] Most of the literature on deterrence focuses on nuclear deterrence. For some works on conventional deterrence, see, *inter alia*, Raul Naroll *et al*, *Military Deterrence in History* (New York: New York UP, 1974); George Quester, *Deterrence Before Hiroshima* (New York and London: John Wiley, 1966); Alan Alexandroff and Richard Rosecrance, 'Deterrence in 1939', *World Politics*, Vol. XXIX, No. 3 (April 1977), pp. 404–24.
[71] See Irvine J. Cohen, 'Israeli Defense Capability', *National Defense* (January/February 1976), pp. 271–4.
[72] *World Armaments and Disarmaments 1975* (see note 55), p. 216.
[73] *Ibid.*
[74] See, *inter alia*, *Aviation Week*, 29 March 1977, pp. 15–17.
[75] *Ibid*, 15 December 1975, p. 11.
[76] *Aviation Week*, 5 April 1976, p. 21.
[77] *Ibid*, pp. 20–21.
[78] The literature on conventional surprise attacks is extensive. For some of the better-known studies combining theoretical insights with case studies, see Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962) and A. & R. Wohlstetter, 'Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight', *Foreign Affairs* 43, July 1965, pp. 691–707; Klaus Knorr, 'Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: the Case of the Cuban Missiles', *World Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 455–67; Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York and London: Columbia UP, 1974), part III; Barton Whaley, *Codeword Barbarona* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973). For studies of the 1973 surprise attack, see Michael Handel, *Perception, Deception and Surprise: the Case of the Yom Kippur War*, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 19 (Jerusalem, 1976), and Avi Shlaim, 'Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: the Case of the Yom Kippur War', *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 348–80.
[79] For a discussion of possible Israeli military reactions to an impending Arab attack, see Z. Shiff, *Haaretz*, 29 July 1974. Shiff argues that for political reasons (American reaction), there is a higher likelihood of a limited Israeli pre-emptive strike than a full-scale preventive war.
[80] For some parallel measures – albeit in a completely different context, which therefore imposes a somewhat different approach – see Joseph I. Coffey, *New Approaches to Arms Reduction in Europe*, Adelphi Paper No. 105 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1974).
[81] For a discussion of the distinction between strategic and tactical indicators for a surprise attack, see Abraham Ben Zvi, 'Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks', *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 381–95.
[82] And see Yair Evron, *The Demilitarization of Sinai*, *op. cit.* in note 2.
[83] See, for example, Sadat's statement in Washington, *New York Times*, 5 April 1977, p. 11.
[84] For an interesting debate on a proposal for no first use of nuclear weapons, see Robert Tucker, Klaus Knorr, Richard A. Falk and Hedley Bull, *Proposal for No First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Pros and Cons*, Policy Memorandum No. 28 (Center for International Studies, Princeton University, 1963).
[85] John Barton has pointed out in a private communication that, given Middle East history, such punitive or compensatory military action may be disastrous. There is indeed a dilemma. Should deterrence threats be emphasized so as to make violations less likely, or should more flexibility be introduced into the system? The answer is always uncertain. One possible solution is to devise a list of different sanctions for different violations. The main burden of the arguments remains, however, that the arms-control regime to be created should incorporate as many constraints on violations as possible. The threat of military sanctions would be much more effective than the overall arms-control impact of a NFUFT.
[86] See Anne Cahn, 'Arms Transfers Constraints: Who, What, When, How and Why', (mimeo), 1976, p. 12.
[87] Philip Farley, quoted in *ibid.*
[88] For some of the earlier and better-known works see James F. Dibgy, *Precision-Guided Weapons*, Adelphi Paper No. 118 (London: IISS, 1975); Albert Wohlstetter, 'Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era', *Orbis* (Winter 1974); Richard Burt, 'New Weapons Technologies and European Security', *Orbis* (Summer 1975), pp. 515–6; Geoffrey Kemp, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Uri Ra'anan (eds), *The Other Arms Race: New Technologies and Non-nuclear Conflict* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975).
[89] See Luttwak and Horowitz, *op. cit.* in note 11, an Herzog, *op. cit.* in note 60.
[90] See especially Digby, *op. cit.* in note 88; Steven L. Canby, *The Alliance and Europe Part IV, Military Doctrine and Technology*, Adelphi Paper No. 109 (London: IISS, 1975); Richard Burt, *op. cit.* in note 88; also some of the contributions to Donald Brennan (ed.), *The Implications of Precision Weapons for American Strategic Interests* (Croton on Hudson, N.Y.: The Hudson Institute, HI-2204, January 1975), and to Kemp, Pfaltzgraff and Ra'anan, *op. cit.* in note 88.
[91] See for example Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, 'The Future of the Battle Tank', and Mike W. Fossier, 'The Role of SAMs in Tactical Warfare', both in Kemp, Pfaltzgraff and Ra'anan, *op. cit.* in note 88. Doubts about the efficacy of PGM in general and also about their debatable contribution to arms control are expressed in James L. Foster, *The Future of Conventional Arms Control* (paper delivered to the American Political Science Association, September 1975).
[92] An argument in favour of full Soviet participation in a joint guarantee of a political settlement is included in Zbigniew Brzezinski, François Duchêne and Kiichi Saeki, 'Peace in an International Framework', *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1975. George Ball also refers to the possibility of joint policies devised by the super-powers to bring about a peace in the Middle East; see his 'Kissinger's Paper Peace: How Not to Handle the Middle East', *The Atlantic Monthly* (February 1976).
[93] See US Senate, Commission on Foreign Relations, *Memorandum of the Agreement between the Governments of Israel and the United States*, *Hearing*, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington DC: USPGO, 7 October 1975) for an important discussion about the implications of this American undertaking, in particular the statements (and following discussion) of Henry Kissinger and George Ball, and for 'Early-Warning System in Sinai', *Ibid.*, Report No. 94–415.
[94] The experience with the armistice commissions set up according to the 1949 armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon respectively was a mixed one. In times of great tension one or the other of the sides to the Israeli–Egyptian and Israeli–Syrian commissions opted out and paralysed the commission. They were also not very effective in dealing with various complaints raised by one side or the other. Nevertheless, they also served many times as a constructive mechanism for solving outstanding problems. Two factors may contribute to the increased effectiveness of future arms-control regulatory commissions: first, they would be established within the framework of a comprehensive arms-control regime; second, the United States (and possibly, in some cases, the Soviet Union as well) would serve as arbiter and would have much more impact than the UN representative who sat on the armistice commissions.
[95] For an expression of support for the idea of American military guarantee to Israel, see Richard H. Ullman, 'After Rabat: Middle East Risks and American Roles', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, and his 'Alliance with Israel?' *Foreign Policy*, No. 19 (Summer 1975), pp. 18–33; Stanley Hoffmann, 'A New Policy for Israel', *Foreign Affairs*, April 1975, mentions it but with reservations. For a criticism of this position, see Robert Tucker, 'Israel and the United States: From Dependence to Nuclear Weapons?', *Commentary*, Vol. 60, No. 5 (November 1975), pp. 29–43.